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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
 
NATIVIST NOTIONS: 
THE EFFECTS OF ANTI-IMMIGRATION PARTIES ON MAINSTREATM 
CONSERVATIVE PARTIES IN WESTERN EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES 
 
This is an analysis of flank and shift effects in political sociology that focuses on 
anti-immigrant parties in eight European countries.  In a positive radical flank effect the 
radical party makes the moderate and mildly-threatening parties look good.  In turn, that 
moderate party then gains power or at least many of their ends.  A negative radical flank 
effect occurs when the actual or perceived association of the moderate party with the 
radical party causes the moderate party to lose support.  Radical shift effects are when the 
moderate or conservative party shifts its policy toward the radical direction.  In this case, 
the radical party may become a coalition partner with the moderate or conservative party.  
And conservative or moderate shift is when the radical party shifts its policy toward a 
more moderate direction in order to assume power or court votes.  The radical flank 
effects have some currency in the civil rights literature, but the other two effects have 
been largely ignored.  This thesis shows that the radical shifts, radical flank, and 
moderate shift effects do have explanatory value in political sociology.  
 
KEYWORDS: Western European political parties, political sociology, anti-immigration, 
radical flank effect, frame-building 
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Chapter 1:    Introduction to Flank and Shift Analysis in Political Sociology and 
Social Movement Theory 
In most every social movement, there are multiple factions.  These factions differ 
in their goals, their desired scope and degree of influence, the resources they have at their 
disposal, the methods that they are willing to use, and—that characteristic that is often 
most definitive—their values.  Jo Freeman coined the term “radical flank” to describe 
those factions within the women’s liberation movement whose actions and values depart 
significantly with those of the mainstream (Freeman 1975:236).  Herbert Haines further 
explores the idea of radical flanks, focusing on the American Civil Rights Movement 
(1984, 1988).  His inquiry attempts to determine if and how the radical flank of a social 
movement affects the goal attainment of the moderate flank, a phenomenon he terms 
“radical flank effect” (1984).  Often, it is believed that radical flanks alienate sympathy 
for a social movement.  Freeman (1975) and Haines (1984,1988) suggest otherwise, 
finding that, in their inquires, the radical flank not only calls society’s attention to the 
plight of the social movement participants, but it also provides a contrast against which 
more moderate “organizations and individuals could appear respectable” (1975: 236).  If 
this is the case, radical flanks and their possible effects could account for more social 
movement and organizational phenomena than is currently explained.  Additionally, in 
this study I wish to address a shortcoming in current literature regarding the impact a 
radical flank may have on the moderate flank.  In some cases, the presence of a radical 
group can lead to a shift in the position in the moderate group, whether it is a shift further 
away from the mainstream to appeal to certain constituencies, or a shift further to the 
center to keep from alienating certain constituencies.  In other cases, the radical group 
may shift ideologies to gain support or legitimacy or to fulfill an unmet need further out 
on the fringes of the political system.  Thus, to account for this phenomenon in this study, 
I would like to introduce the terms “radical shift effect” and “moderate shift effect” to 
describe these instances.   
Research Objective 
In this inquiry I will be attempting to determine whether the presence of a radical 
flank within a movement leads to a positive or negative “radical flank effect” (+RFE,  
-RFE), a “radical shift effect” (RSE), “moderate shift effect” (MSE), or no effect at all on 
the level of national political parties across eighteen countries, regarding one political 
issue (see Figure 1 for a map of these effects).   
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Figure 1:   Radical Flank, Radical Shift, and Moderate Shift Effects  
 
(1) Positive Radical Flank Effect:  The fear (2) Radical Shift Effect:  The moderate 
of the radical party causes the conservative    conservative party shifts its ideology closer 
or moderate party to gain votes and power.    to that of the radical party, often in an               
       attempt to keep or regain support. 
 
  2
           
                    - - - - - 
 
Conservative or 
Moderate Party 
Radical Anti-
immigrant Party 
Radical Anti-
immigrant Party
Conservative or 
Moderate Party 
(3) Negative Radical Flank Effect: A                  (4) Moderate Shift Effect:  A radical  
conservative or moderate party is tainted by        anti-immigrant party may shift toward  
its association with a radical party and it       the moderate party right party,                             
suffers as a result.                                                 especially if they have a chance to join a  
      coalition in power. 
 
 
 
                    - - - - 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Radical Anti-
immigrant Party 
Conservative or 
Moderate Party 
Conservative or 
Moderate Party 
Radical Anti-
immigrant Party 
  3
Specifically, I will be focusing on whether or not anti-immigration parties impact 
the support for or position of moderate right-wing parties on the issue of immigration in 
the years 1980 to 2005.  According to Haines, radical flank effects, “are patterns of gains 
or losses, successes or failures experienced by moderate organizations which can be 
directly attributed to the activities of more radical organizations or other groups” 
(1988:10).  Though Haines attributes it to the actions of radical groups, for the purposes 
of this study, the presence of these groups will be the focus.  When the moderate 
organizations gain from the presence of more radical organizations, it is referred to as 
positive radical flank effect (+RFE).  When the moderate organization experiences a loss 
as a result of the presence of the radical flank this is considered a negative radical flank 
effect (-RFE).  Thus far, the concept of radical flank effect has been exclusively used to 
describe social movement phenomena.  This study will take a step towards determining 
whether or not this concept is useful in studying other organizational phenomena.   An 
additional goal is to coin a term to describe the phenomenon in which moderate groups 
change their position on an issue due to the presence of radical groups.  When the 
moderate groups shifts away from the center as a result of the radical flank it will be 
considered a radical shift effect (RSE), and when the radical group shifts towards the 
center it will be called a moderate shift effect (MSE). 
I expect to find that the presence of anti-immigration political parties has often 
impacted moderate right-wing political parties.  I believe that in some cases anti-
immigration parties have served as an extreme contrast to moderate right-wing parties, 
thus calling attention to immigration issues, while simultaneously adding to their appeal 
as “respectable”, which results in the increasing support for moderate groups and their 
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empowerment to enact their policy.  Hence, I expect that the presence of anti-
immigration political parties will, sometimes, lead to gains for moderate right-wing 
parties, or, will lead to a positive radical flank effect.  However, I believe there will also 
be cases in which the presence of anti-immigration parties has led moderate parties to 
develop a more hard-line stance on immigration in an effort to compete for constituency 
against the anti-immigration parties.  Therefore I also expect that the presence of anti-
immigration parties can also, sometimes, lead to the radicalization of the position of 
moderates, or, in this case, a radical shift effect.  
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Literature Review and Background 
 Flanks and shifts involve a social movement on the radical side and a better-
established group on the moderate end.  Consequently, this literature review will start 
with social movement theory and radical flank effects, and then it will move to political 
parties and how they change their ideologies and positions vis-à-vis other parties, public 
opinion, and social movements. 
Social Movement Theory 
 Classical social movement theories view collective action as deviance (Skolnick 
1969, McAdam 1997).  Historically, social movements were put in the same category as 
group conduct and mob behavior, and analyzed in a way that blatantly neglected context 
and agency (Della Porta and Diani 2006).  Some theories treated collective action as a 
sum of all of its participants, while others treated it as if the participants were irrelevant.  
As was classical of the era of sociology dominated by structural-functionalism—from the 
1940s to, arguably, the early 1970s—anything perceived as disruptive, or dysfunctional 
was labeled as anomalous.   
 In recent decades, however, there has been a surge in new social movement 
theory.  In the seventies and eighties, the resource mobilization paradigm was introduced 
(McClurg and Mueller 1992).  This theory suggests that, while several factors affect 
whether or not a social movement is successful, the most integral factor is the ability of 
social movement actors to collect and mobilize resources towards inciting social change 
(Oberschall 1973, Tilly 1978).  Specifically, it “emphasizes the interaction between 
resource availability, the preexisting organization of preference structures, and 
entrepreneurial attempts to meet preference demand” (McCarthy and Zald 1997:166).  
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Though this was a grand departure from the limited view provided by classical social 
movement theory, many still felt that this theory did not account for the subjectivity in 
human action; that it was too “utilitarian” (Fireman and Gamson 1979).   
 As the pendulum swings yet again, there are quite a few trends emerging from the 
vulnerabilities of the resource mobilization paradigm as a universal explanatory tool in 
the study of social movements.  Steven Buechler addresses some of these shortcomings, 
and discusses some emerging theoretical musings (1997).  Most of these new directions 
emphasize the focus on characteristics specific to individual movements.  He basically 
instructs social movement theorists to accept social movement organizations on their own 
terms instead of selectively accepting only the facets that reinforce resource mobilization 
theory.  He makes a list of, “ten issues which pose some degree of challenge to the RM 
[resource mobilization] framework” which includes,  
rethinking grievances…recognizing ideology…deconstructing organization… 
distinguishing levels of analysis…interpreting the micro-level…theorizing the 
macro-level…transcending the rational actor…analyzing collective 
identity…acknowledging movement diversity…[and] bringing the culture back in 
(Buechler 1997:197-207). 
 
These recommendations follow similar trends occurring in other areas of sociology which 
accentuates the role of culture in society and social phenomena.  Johnston, Laraña, and 
Gusfield also emphasize the need for a different analysis infrastructure, citing that many 
social movements are not effectively analyzed by existing theoretical paradigms; that, 
within sociology, there is an, “inability of these movements to be clearly understood 
within the European or American traditions of analysis” (1997:275).  In this inquiry I 
hope to compliment this social movement theory by exploring the role of radical flanks in 
politics.   
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Theories of Political Coalition Formation 
 Sociological theories of political parties start with Michels (1915) with more 
recent contributions by Riker (1962), Boix (1998) and Lane and Erson (1999).  This 
thesis is not concerned with overall theories of parties, but more specifically with the 
formation of coalitions and how parties may attack or repel each other, especially on the 
right wing of the ideological spectrum (Lane and Ersson 1999: 102-192).  The standard 
theory of political coalition formation focuses on the “minimum winning coalition” 
which is most desired because it is less complicated, more likely to be stable, and 
entailing the least amount of ideological conflict (Dodd 1976, Pridham 1986).  Often left 
or right parties find a smaller party in the center (such as the Free Democrats in Germany 
or the Farmers or Center Party in Sweden) who can be part of a coalition with little fuss.  
However, the potential coalition partners considered in this thesis are not in the center.  
They are to the extreme right of the conservative or more moderate parties (for example, 
the FrP and FN).  Most of the literature on Western Europe that looks at coalitions is 
more interested in left coalitions (Boix 1998).  A further problem with this literature is 
that finding the minimum winning coalition says very little about ideology.  With radical 
flank and shift effects, ideology is critical. 
 But pragmatically, every coalition involves shifting or at least compromising 
ideologies since it is rare that different political parties have exactly the same platforms 
and ideologies.  Axelrod (2006, revised edition) provides an allied theory of coalition 
formation that focuses on expectations of trust in a somewhat continuously repeated 
game.  I apply the basics of his theory to the type of coalitions where the dominant 
partner trusts the smaller partner enough and also where the dominant partner thinks that 
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it can benefit from the smaller partner’s electoral rise.  In this situation, enough trust 
evolves to produce a shift in ideology of the dominant partner toward the smaller partner 
with the expectation that the smaller partner will be more or less discrete.  Where the 
smaller partner is not expected to be so discrete, the dominant partner will expect the 
smaller partner to shift toward it instead.  Either case is a repeated game, but they lead to 
different results.  While Axelrod uses a rational choice approach assuming the ability to 
freely choose one’s ideology and strategy, my approach is much more rooted in 
contextual factors such as fascist/non-fascist history and the development of ideology 
within the social movement based anti-immigrant parties.  Consequently, it is more of a 
sociological institution building approach that examines the growth of social movement 
ideology and leadership.   
These theories are oriented toward shifts, but radical flank effects generally 
presume that the radical party does not enter the coalition.  And this may be the case for 
minimum winning coalition theory.  However, maximum coalitions, such as those that 
developed in Italy (and somewhat in France), do tend to admit radical parties even while 
the radical flank effects takes place.  In this case, the coalition benefits from the radical 
party but in the coalition, which is too large to satisfy every ideological position, the 
radical party and others can be effectively ignored.  
Hypotheses Concerning Radical Flank, Radical Shift and Moderate Shift Effects 
The various factions within a social movement, and their respective actions, 
influence the goal attainment of the other factions.  Each faction contributes to how the 
social movement, as a whole, is perceived by society.  Therefore, it is important to 
understand how different factions within a social movement, or other organizational 
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context, are framed with respect to one another, and what influence they have on one 
another.  For example, when the National Association for the Advancement for Color 
People (NAACP) was taking a legislative approach, the Southern Christian Leadership 
Council (SCLC) executed a series of non-violent direct action campaigns (McAdam 
1982; Morris 1984; Haines 1988).  Because of this contrast, the NAACP went from being 
“radical” for fighting for the rights of African-Americans, to “moderate” as compared to 
the direct-action approach of the SCLC.  Later, when the SCLC embraced non-violence 
and piety, the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)—starting as early 
as 1966—embarked on more confrontational tactics, and began embracing the black 
power ideology (Haines 1988:59).  At this point, the SCLC was reinterpreted as 
“moderate” in their approach relative to the SNCC.  I could present the entire spectrum of 
groups that made up the Civil Rights movement, but I believe that these three groups 
illustrate my point effectively. 
 As mentioned earlier, Jo Freeman first addressed radical flank effect in her work 
about the Women’s Movement (1975).  However, exploring the radical flank effect at 
work in this movement was not the primary goal of this work, thus, it was not 
systematically explored.  Herbert Haines conducted the first systematic exploration of the 
phenomenon in his work about the moderate and radical factions in the Civil Rights 
movement (1984, 1988).  Since the time of this work, several social movement theorists 
have employed the use of this term as a tool in understanding social movement 
phenomena (see McAdam 1992, McAdam et. al. 1996, Dillard 2002, Gupta 2002, 
Rohlinger 2006).  In her work, Gupta explores radical flank effect phenomena within 
Basque and Welsh nationalist movements (2002).  Additionally, she further systematizes 
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some of the unspoken assumptions in the study of radical flank effect, while still 
recognizing that radical flank effect is under-theorized.  Dillard applies radical flank 
effect theory to both the animal rights movement, and the environmentalist movement, 
and finds similar outcomes to those of Haines (2002; 1984, 1988).  Overall, while work is 
being done to interrogate the notion of radical flank effect, fill in theoretical gaps, and 
clarify the scope of relevance, the current field of theory on radical flank effect leaves 
quite a bit of room for additional work. 
Hypothesis One – Positive Radical Flank Effect:  The presence of anti-immigration 
political parties will lead to gains for moderate conservatives—a positive radical flank 
effect.  This happens because the existence of the anti-immigrant party brings the issues 
into the political dialogue while the moderate conservative political party represents an 
acceptable and legitimate way to address the issues.  
In this case, the conservative or moderate party experiences more success with their 
policies because the public and politicians are made more aware of immigration issues 
but are wary of supporting a party that they perceive as the “rogue” radical party.  The 
conservative party represents a stable and legitimate way to deal with the increase in 
immigration and asylum without risking any drastic departure from the conventional 
political structure. 
Hypothesis Two – Radical Shift Effect: The presence of anti-immigration parties leads 
to the radicalization of the position of moderates, or, in this case, a “radical shift effect” 
that causes the moderate parties to take a less conventional stance.  This happens 
because the anti-immigration party fulfills a need of the electorate that is not being 
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addressed by the conventional political parties, thus leading to a transfer of support from 
the moderate party to the anti-immigrant party.   
In this case, the conservative or moderate party shifts to embrace ideologies similar to 
those of the radical party, especially their anti-immigrant position.  I believe there will be 
cases in which the presence of anti-immigration parties has led moderate parties to 
develop a more hard-line stance on immigration in an effort to compete for constituency 
against the anti-immigration parties.   
Hypothesis Three – Negative Radical Flank Effect: The presence of anti-immigration 
parties leads to losses for moderate right-wing groups, or, will lead to a negative radical 
flank effect.  This happens because the electorate perceives the message of the anti-
immigration party as too radical a departure from socially accepted ideology, and 
believes there to be an association between the moderate right-wing party and the 
radical anti-immigration party. 
In this case, the moderate conservative party loses support because of an alliance or 
perceived relationship with the radical party.  Because of the stigma associated with the 
radical anti-immigration position—often associated with xenophobia—the support for the 
moderate conservative party is compromised.   
Hypothesis Four - Moderate Shift Effect:  Marginal success of anti-immigration parties 
leads to their possible inclusion in the ruling coalition.  Thus, the radical party will 
moderate its anti-immigrant positions to further become part of the mainstream political 
apparatus. 
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In this case, the radical party shifts to the conservative or moderate party position because 
they are given a chance at legitimacy.  As a result, they will temper inflammatory 
language and try to emphasize a less radical ideology. 
Hypothesis Five- Null Hypothesis: The presence of anti-immigration parties does not 
have an effect on moderate conservative parties.   
It may simply be possible that the more political power one loses, the more a 
voter may shift to another party’s policy position.  One might call this the imitation or 
realist position.  If something else is working, then other parties may be inclined to adopt 
it if they cannot find an effective way to counter it.  So when anti-immigrant parties are 
doing well, moderate right parties shift in their direction.  When moderate right or 
conservative parties are doing well, anti-immigrant parties shift in their direction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Figure 2:   Explaining Radical Flank, Radical Shift, and Moderate Shift Effects   
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The Development of Anti-Immigration Parties 
 Since the 1980s, political parties and social movements with strong anti-
immigration platforms have been popping up in many democratic industrialized 
countries.  These groups differ immensely in their rhetoric and the degree of their anti-
immigration stance.  Some take only a nationalistic approach with subtle anti-immigrant 
undertones, while others are outwardly reminiscent of the times of authoritarian fascist 
governments.  Fittingly, their given constituencies also differ.  In some cases these parties 
and movements attract almost exclusively male, young, working-class individuals, while 
in other contexts, they have a constituency composed of individuals from an array of 
socioeconomic backgrounds, genders, and ages.  For the most part, this anti-immigration 
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sentiment is directed at those immigrants coming from countries less developed than the 
country of destination, and more often than not, at immigrants whose appearance differs 
from that of Western Europeans, such as those from Africa or the Middle East.   
There are multiple theories regarding this sudden surge in these social movements 
and political parties.  Joel S. Fetzer explores some theories regarding societal attitudes 
regarding immigration, including the marginality theory, the economic self-interest 
theory, and the contact theory (2000:5-15).  In her book regarding the growth of anti-
immigration parties in Europe, Rachel Gibson tests two theories: first, the notion that 
“these parties represent a re-growth of racism”, and second, an argument that, “centers on 
the more instrumental arguments that link socioeconomic decline to an upsurge of anti-
immigration sentiment” (2002:5).  She finds that both of these explanations can account 
for a portion of the phenomenon.  Additionally, she tries to determine whether the 
appearance of these parties incited further anti-immigration sentiment, or if an under-
represented portion of the population agitated the need for representation.  Again, she 
found that it was the case that the sentiment existed before the anti-immigration parties 
and social movements appeared on the political scene, but that their appearance did act to 
agitate further anti-immigration sentiment (2002).  Both Fetzer and Gibson conclude that 
anti-immigration sentiments involve both interpersonal issues as well as societal-level 
issues.  Though there are multiple works that address the increase in anti-immigration 
political parties and social movements, there is no systematic exploration of how these 
groups have influenced the more moderate right-wing groups, and their position on 
immigration issues.  If the existence of radical right-wing groups causes moderate right-
wing groups to take a harder stance on immigration issues, it would be significant to the 
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understanding of the development of anti-immigration political parties, social 
movements, and policy. 
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Chapter 2:  Research Design, Data Collection and Boolean Methods 
 To conduct my inquiry I will be employing a comparative historical method.  In 
particular, I will be employing the Boolean method introduced by Ragin (1987).  I will 
focus on eight countries in the time period from 1980 to 2005, which will be broken 
down into five segments.  This time period has been chosen because the prevalence of 
anti-immigration parties saw a particular surge during this time period.  By breaking this 
time period down into segments, I intend to show the development of the parties over 
time and the development of the sociocultural and political circumstances in each 
country.  I will be using multiple sources, including information compiled by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), sources that provide 
electoral information, as well as more in-depth case-study information.   
Research Design and Data 
In my research design I focus on how moderate conservative political parties 
change or do not change their immigration policy positions.  I do this in five periods:  
1980 to 1984, 1985 to 1989, 1990 to 1994, 1995 to 1999 and 2000 to 2005.  While the 
four earlier periods are essential to tell the story of the countries leading up to 2000, they 
are not the focus of this investigation.  The primary focus will be the time period from 
2000-2005.  It is during this time that the flank effects and shift effects can be seen and 
studied most effectively.  I develop three variables outlined graphically in parts (1), (2), 
(3), and (4) of figure 1.  The first is the positive radical flank effect where the moderate or 
conservative party maintains its original position on immigration, and the brouhaha 
caused by the radical anti-immigrant party only increases the popularity of the moderate 
or conservative party.  This will be indicated by no shift in the moderate or conservative 
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party’s position on immigration.  The second is the radical shift effect which is indicated 
by the moderate or conservative party altering its policy position on immigration in a 
radical direction and to some extent (though not completely) toward the position of the 
radical part.  The third position—the negative radical flank effect—is that the moderate 
party looses support because of a perceived relationship with the radical party.  The 
fourth position is one in which the radical-anti-immigrant party has a chance of gaining 
power so it shifts its anti-immigrant stance to a much more moderate position, usually 
one close to the moderate or conservative party.  It does not go as far as the left or green 
parties, but it becomes more moderate in its tone and emphasizes other issues 
(bureaucracy, taxes, etc.).  Each of these party positions will be measured by the 
publically stated political platforms of each party, especially at times close to elections 
when their positions become more visible and well defined.   
Two conditions must be present for a country to be in my analysis.  I will refer to 
them as independent variables in the method of agreement sense; however, they are not 
causally important.  The first one is that the country must have an anti-immigration party 
because without such a party no shift could occur.  Second, there must be a strong 
moderate right or conservative party.  Thus, the two actors in my analysis must be present 
for flanks or shifts to actually occur. 
I began with seventeen countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United States of America and the United Kingdom.  This list 
represents highly industrialized democratic countries with significant anti-immigrant 
constituencies.  I eliminated all non-European countries to streamline the focus of the 
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study.  While I could have done a study that included all the countries around the world 
with anti-immigration parties, I wanted to focus on a smaller geographical region to look 
at countries with a shared history, and to eliminate extraneous variables.  This left me 
with Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.  From that point, I 
eliminated Germany, Ireland, and the United Kingdom because the anti-immigration 
parties in these countries have never held a seat at the federal level.  Next, I eliminated 
those countries in which the anti-immigration party was short-lived or never reached a 
significant percentage of representation at the federal level.  While there was one “flash 
in the pan” in the Netherlands with List Pim Fortuyn receiving 17% of the vote in the 
2002 elections, no other anti-immigration party received over 3% from 1980-2005.  
When charismatic leader Pim Foruyn was assassinated, his anti-immigration movement 
in the Netherlands died with him.  Finally, Switzerland was eliminated at a later point in 
the study because I found Switzerland extremely opaque.  While some information was 
available, it was not comparable to the information I was able to obtain about political 
parties from the remaining countries.  Thus, I would not have been able to adequately 
compare the variables in Switzerland to those of the other eight countries. 
The main independent variables that explain flanks and shifts are economic, 
migration and political variables.  First, unemployment makes the influx of immigrants 
painful to natives who may be unemployed or who know of others who are.  Thus, I 
collect standardized unemployment rates from the OECD publications that standardize 
them according to common definitions.  This is because some rates come from surveys 
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and others come from administrative records.  The later rates tend to be lower, so OECD 
has devised a method to raise them to the comparable survey rate. 
The migration variables are the immigration rate and asylum-seeker inflow rates.  
Very high immigration rates could conceivably raise awareness and possibly hostility 
toward immigrants.  The immigration rates are the long-term inflows of immigrants into 
the country, and they come from the OECD SOPEMI reports for Europe, America, Japan 
and Austral-Asia.  Asylum seekers are a group of immigrants who started to be singled 
out in the 1980s by the UN because of their extreme needs.  Often time they receive 
special care and benefits from the receiving country, and consequently, they can be more 
expensive than other immigrants.  Further, since their asylum cases are being heard by 
tribunals, they often cannot work.  Despite their extreme and dire needs, the native 
population often does not like to see non-citizens seemingly receiving special treatment.  
As a result, the more a country admits asylum seekers, the more the population may 
support anti-immigrant parties.  Asylum seekers as a percentage of the population are 
also taken from the OECD SOPEMI reports.  
Third, I look at the political party power of the radical anti-immigrant parties and 
the moderate right or conservative parties.  Clearly, as one becomes more popular, the 
other may be tempted to adopt their policies or at least move closer to them.  I collect this 
data from the parliamentary seats each party holds in the legislature.  One of the 
dilemmas of this study was deciding how to determine which legislative bodies to 
include.  Many of the legislatures in these countries are bicameral.   In some cases, one 
house has significantly more power than the other.  In other cases, they are somewhat 
equal—albeit regarding different matters.  Given that this inquiry intends to vaguely 
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explore immigration policy, those legislative bodies that do not have the capacity to 
introduce policy will not add any explanatory value.  Additionally, some legislative 
bodies are directly elected while others are indirectly elected or appointed.  The dilemma 
in this case is that part of the focus of this study is the behavior of political parties in 
reaction to voter behavior.  Thus, in the cases where a legislative body is indirectly 
elected or appointed, voter behavior is either not going to be a clear or not going to be a 
factor at all.  For the purposes of this study, for a legislative body to be included, it not 
only must have the capacity to introduce and implement policy, it must also be directly 
elected.   
Methods of Analysis 
These data will be analyzed according to Boolean methods.  This is an approach 
promulgated by Charles Ragin (1990, 1998), and it provides a sensitive approach to 
combine qualitative and quantitative methods.  Case studies of each country in the project 
will develop a sensitive assessment of the main dependent variables and causal process 
that occur within each country.  Then in chapter six, I put those values into a Boolean 
table to analyze them according to methods of difference and similarity. 
Boolean analysis requires dichotomous data (1 or 0) that indicates the presence or 
absence of a variable.  This requires that I create cutting points for the unemployment, 
immigration and asylum rates mentioned above.  To establish these cutting points I will 
compare the average of the rates for the each five-year period and compare that to the 
average for the entire twenty-five year period, and determine the dichotomous variable 
based on that.   
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Each country in this study has a unique set of economic circumstances, which has 
affected the economy, and thus the unemployment rate of each country.  For this reason, 
a universal cutting point will not be established for unemployment rate.  Instead, the 
circumstances of each country will be taken into account, as will the global context, to 
establish a cutting point appropriate for each case. One of the factors that has clearly 
affected the unemployment rate of each country was the global recession that occurred 
from 1990-1993; though this recession impacted the economy of each country differently.  
Additionally, it is clear that the collapse of the Soviet Union contributed to a spike in 
immigration rates during the first half of the 1990s.   
In Denmark, the cutting point for the unemployment rates from 1980-2005 is 
6.4%.  This was determined by taking an average of the unemployment rates throughout 
the 1980-2005 time period. The cutting point for Danish immigration rates is 0.37%.  As 
with unemployment, the cutting point for immigration rate was determined by taking an 
average of the immigration rates throughout the 1980-2005 time period. The cutting point 
for the asylum-seeker inflow rates in Denmark is set at .117%.  This number is the 
average of all of the asylum-seeker inflow rates from 1980-2005.  
The cutting point for the unemployment rates in Austria from 1980-2005 is 3.3%.  
This was determined by taking an average of the unemployment rates throughout the 
1980-2005 time period.  The cutting point for Austrian rates of immigration is 1.03%.  As 
with unemployment, the cutting point for immigration rate was determined by taking an 
average of the available immigration rates from the 1980-2005 time period (which were 
those for 1998-2005). The cutting point for the rates of inflow of Austrian asylum-seekers 
is set at .206%.  This number is the average of all of rates from 1980-2005.  
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In Italy, the cutting point for the unemployment rates from 1980-2005 is 9.2%.  
This was determined by taking an average of the unemployment rates throughout the 
1980-2005 time period. The recession that occurred from 1990 to 1993 surely played a 
significant role in this increase, as did the Tangentopoli—Italian for “bribe city”—
scandal, the name given to the Italian political system that was highly corrupt that was 
revealed through investigation in 1993.  The cutting point for Italian immigration rates is 
0.44%.  As with unemployment, the cutting point for immigration rate was determined by 
taking an average of all of the immigration rates available within the 1980-2005 time 
period (which were from 1998-2002 and 2004-2005). The cutting point for the asylum-
seeker inflow rates in Italy is set at 0.015%.  This number is the average of all of the 
available asylum application rates from 1980-2005 (which includes those from 1983-
2005).  
The cutting point for the unemployment rate in France has been set at 9.5%.  This 
is representative of the average of all the immigration rates from 1980-2005.  The cutting 
point for immigration rates in France is set at 0.15%. The cutting point for asylum-seeker 
inflow rates in France is set at 0.058%.  This number is representative of the average of 
all of the rates from 1980-2001.  
Belgium suffered two significant economic declines in the time period from 1980-
2001.   The first occurred at the beginning of the 1980s and the other occurred early in 
the 1990s.  As a result, there are two waves of high unemployment in this time period.   
In 1975 the unemployment rate in Belgium was 5.0%, then 8.2% in 1979, and finally up 
to 11% in 1982 (OECD Economic Outlook 2007, 2000, and 1984).  While it did go back 
down after the government implemented a program spurring economic recovery, it rose 
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again in the early 1990s.  From 6.4% in 1991, it jumped to 9.8% by 1994 (OECD 
Economic Outlook 2007, 2000, and 1984).  The cutting point for the unemployment rate 
in Belgium has been established at 8.8%.  This was established by taking an average of 
all of the yearly rates from 1980-2001, thus establishing an appropriate threshold that 
accounts for both waves of unemployment. The cutting point for Belgium rates of 
immigration is 0.51%.  As with unemployment, the cutting point for immigration rate 
was determined by taking an average of the immigration rates throughout the 1980-2005 
time period.  The cutting point for asylum application rates in Belgium is  0.137%.  
Because there was no obvious cutting point for the asylum-seeker inflow rates, the 
average of the Belgium asylum-seeker inflow rates from the entire period were used.  
In all three Nordic countries, the “[d]eregulation of financial markets [which] led 
to a (procyclical) boom in consumer borrowing, inflation of asset prices, and overheating 
of the economy followed by banking collapse and consumer retrenchment” had a strong 
effect on unemployment rates(Huber and Stephens 2001:260).  The impact of the 
economic crisis that occurred in all three Nordic countries was less devastating in 
Norway than in Sweden and Finland because of “the inflow of funds from the oil sector” 
(Huber and Stephens 2001:257).  Though the unemployment rates in Norway did seem to 
follow the same pattern as those in Sweden at the turn of the decade.  In the case of 
Norway, however, this increase can be seen three years earlier.  Unemployment went 
from 2.1% in 1987, to 3.3% in 1988, up to 5.4% in 1989 (OECD Economic Outlook 
2007, 2000, and 1984).  The cutting point for unemployment in Norway has also been 
established at 4.0%, the average of all of the unemployment rates from 1980-2005.   The 
cutting point for the immigration rate in Norway has been set at 0.47%.  This cutting 
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point has been chosen because it is the average of the immigration rate of each year from 
1980-2005.  While there are a few jumps in immigration rate from one year to the next, 
all of the rates from these years generally hover within a particular range.  The cutting 
point for asylum-seeker inflow rates in Norway is 0.131%.  
For unemployment in Finland, the cutting point has been established at 8.7%.  
This cutting point is representative of the average of the unemployment rates from 1980-
2005.  In 1990, the unemployment rate in Finland was at 3.2%, which grew to 6.7% by 
1991, and 11.7% in 1992.  This corresponds with the economic crisis occurring also in 
Sweden and Norway.  However, since Finland’s economy had been trailing that of both 
Sweden and Norway for decades, the conditions in Finland differed substantially, thus 
leading to a more “catastrophic” economic collapse (Huber and Stephens 2001:260).  The 
cutting point for Finnish immigration rates is 0.18%.  This was determined by taking an 
average of the available immigration rates throughout the 1980-2005 time period, which 
include those from 1989-2005.  The cutting point for asylum application rates in Finland 
is set at 0.040%.  This includes the asylum-seeker inflow rates available during the time 
frame, which are those from 1988-2005. 
In Sweden, the cutting point for the unemployment rates from 1980-2005 is 5.1%.  
This was determined by taking an average of the unemployment rates throughout the 
1980-2005 time period. While there seems to be a two-year delay before the impact of 
this crisis fully manifests itself in the unemployment rate, it was the “sharp deterioration 
of the economy” that occurred in late 1989 and early 1990 that caused a jump in 
unemployment from 1.7% in 1990, to 3.1% in 1991, to 5.6% by 1992 (Huber and 
Stephens 2001:243; OECD Economic Outlook 2007, 2000, and 1984).   The cutting point 
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for Swedish immigration rates is 0.47%.  As with unemployment, the cutting point for 
immigration rate was determined by taking an average of the immigration rates 
throughout the 1980-2005 time period. The cutting point for asylum-seeker inflow rates 
in Sweden is set at 0.250%.  This number is representative of the average of all of the 
rates from 1980-2001.  While there are a few gaps within this time period, the high 
degree of fluctuation makes it difficult to determine one cutting point that is appropriate 
for all of them. 
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Chapter 3:  Countries in Which Anti-Immigration Parties Enter into or Play a 
Significant Supporting Role to the Government: Denmark, Austria and Italy 
In an effort to hone in on those countries in which either a radical flank effect or 
radical shift effect could have been possible, it is first necessary to see which anti-
immigration parties have had significant success in the legislative elections.  Once this is 
determined, it is then pertinent to determine whether or not this change can be 
attributed—or at least partially attributed—to a +RFE, a -RFE, a MSE or RSE.  This 
portion of the study has required a good deal of in-depth consideration with each case.   
Denmark 
The recent political history of Denmark is unique in many ways.  On one hand, in 
the mid 1970s, it was recognized for being, “home of the strongest right-wing populist 
party on the continent”, whose leader was known for evading taxes and, later, publicly 
making racist remarks (Fennema 2005:12).   Simultaneously, it was considered one of the 
least restrictive countries in Western Europe regarding immigration policies and 
remained so until more restrictive legislation was passed in 20021 (Adamo 2007).  
Additionally, two different far-right political parties have achieved a considerable 
presence in the time frame upon which this study will be focused, 1980-2005. 
From 1980-2005 there have been two anti-immigration parties represented in the 
People’s Assembly of Denmark—the Folketing.  Both the Progress Party 
(Fremskridtspartiet [FrP]) and the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti [DFp]) have 
 
1 According to Kitschelt (1997:234) there was also a “tough new immigration law that reduced the flow of 
immigrants by 90 percent”.  However, I found no evidence of this elsewhere. 
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had representatives in the legislature.  The FrP was, after the 19882 elections, the fifth-
largest party in the parliament.  The DFp has since breached that threshold, and in the 
2001 elections, became the third largest political party represented in the Folketing 
(Political Handbook of the World).  Many scholars (see Rydgen 2004, Mudde 2007) 
argue that the FrP and DFp are members of two distinct party families, citing that—going 
from their party platforms—the FrP belongs to a populist protest party family, while the 
DFp belongs to the radical right party family.  For the purposes of this study, I will be 
lumping them both into the category of “anti-immigration parties”.  (See Appendix A, 
Table 1 for FrP and DFp seat holdings for 1980-2005.) 
The FrP was founded in 1972 by Mogens Glistrup.   The FrP did not begin as an 
anti-immigration party, but as a “tax-populist, anti-bureaucracy, protest party” (Fennema 
2005:12).  It was not until after the 1984 elections that the FrP adopted an anti-
immigration stance.  However, Glistrup had been making blatantly xenophobic remarks 
in the public sphere since 1979 (Hossay 2002). In 1988—the next parliamentary election 
held after the FrP’s adoption of an anti-immigration policy—the party increased its 
parliamentary representation by ten seats, giving them a total of sixteen (Political 
Handbook of the World).  The 1988 elections would be its height as an anti-immigration 
party.  Glistrup had been engaged in legal battles over tax-evasion for some time, 
which—along with other internal party issues—had contributed to the decline of the party 
(Hossay 2002).  The FrP did win seats in the parliamentary elections of 1990, 1994, and 
1998.  However, it never regained the support it had in the 1988 parliamentary elections.  
 
2 Actually, the FrP was also the fifth-largest party in parliament as a result of the 1981 elections.  However, 
since the party had not embraced an anti-immigrant stance yet, I do not believe this fact is pertinent.   
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In fact, beginning in 1998, the FrP had competition from another anti-immigration party 
that had been formed by a former FrP leader, Pia Kjærsgaard.  
Pia Kjærsgaard started the DFp in “1995 as a break from and after 1998 the de 
facto successor to the Danish Progress Party” (Bjørklund and Andersen 1999b: 107). 
Kjærsgaard had been a member of the FrP since 1979, and had been its leader from 1985-
1994 (Folketinget).  In 1995, amidst internal strife, Kjærsgaard—along with three other 
discontented deputies—left the FrP and founded the DFp, on the basis of an 
ethnopluralist doctrine (Rydgren 2004; “Denmark” 2005).  Unlike the FrP, the DFp self-
identified as an anti-immigration political party from the beginning. Ironically, while 
regarded as more radical-right than the FrP, the DFp managed to present their anti-
immigration stance in a way found to be less offensive to the electorate.  The DFp took 
an approach in which, “ [e]ven though they attack immigration policy, their main target is 
not the immigrants but politics in general” (Fennema 2005:12).  This allowed them to 
invoke both the anti-immigration sentiments held by some of the Danish voters, but also 
those anti-establishment sentiments that attracted many of those previously loyal to the 
FrP.  It allowed the DFp to do so in a way that did not alienate moderate voters whose 
sensibilities would have been offended by anything seemingly racist or xenophobic.  
Evidence of the success of this approach can be seen in the election results of the 1998 
and 2001 parliamentary elections in Denmark, in which the DFp managed to gain 7.4% 
of the vote, which gave them thirteen seats, and 12% of the vote, entitling them to twenty 
seats, respectively (Political Handbook of the World).  In the 2005 elections, the DFp 
gained five more seats.  As noted, the FrP only earned 2.4% of the vote in 1998, which 
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translated into four seats and did not win any seats in the Folketing in 2001, only 
receiving 0.6% of the vote (“Denmark” 2005; Political Handbook of the World).   
 The two powerful moderate right-wing parties in Denmark during this time frame 
have been the Liberal Party of Denmark (Danmarks Liberale Parti or “Venstre” [V]) and 
the Conservative People’s Party (Det Konservative Folkeparti [KF]). The Liberal Party of 
Denmark was, “Denmark's first organized party…opposed to the conservatism and 
political hegemony of the old Hoejre (Right), forerunner of the present-day Conservative 
People's Party” (“Denmark” 2005: 176).  The Conservative People’s Party is a center-
right party that was founded in 1916 on a conservative platform.  From the Folketing 
elections in 1981 until those in late 1990, the KF managed to consistently receive the 
second highest number of votes, second to the Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterne).  
During the 1980-2005 time frame, the KF participated in multiple coalition governments, 
mostly with the Venstre party.  Throughout this time frame, and for many years preceding 
1980, the KF and the V parties have been vying for the position of leading right-wing 
party.  In 2001, the Liberal party beat the Social Democrats out, and became the party 
with the largest representation in the parliament. In this same election, the DFp managed 
to become the third largest party in parliament, and began “supporting the existing 
government of the Liberal Party and Conservative People's Party, without actually being 
a part of the government, and being decisive in establishing a majority in the passing of 
legislative proposals and political measures” (“Denmark” 2005:178).  (See Appendix A, 
Table 1 for KF and V seat holdings for 1980-2005.) 
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ethnopluralism—I argue that t
                                                       
In this work, I argue that there are several specific factors3—some reliant on 
phenomena external to Denmark, some pertaining specifically to the context of 
Denmark—that have played a role in creating the political climate that enabled not one, 
but two anti-immigration parties to rise to prominence in the parliament of a country 
well-known for embracing a liberal immigration policy.  First, I argue that the French 
National Front (Front National [FN]) created a master narrative—or master frame—for 
far-right political parties in the process of organizing their own party in the 1970s and 
early 1980s (Rydgren 2004).  While this metanarrative has been informed by an 
increasing number of localized narratives as more far-right political parties began to 
emerge, I argue that the FN master narrative was the first step in this dynamic process.  
Additionally, I will argue that those who would go on to found the DFp had an 
advantageous glimpse of how to manifest the components of the master frame, as they 
had the opportunity to scrutinize the execution of this master frame by the FrP.  Two 
aspects of this master frame are of specific importance here: the populist aspect and the 
ethnopluralist aspect.  While many far-right parties embodied the populist component, 
fewer were able to exemplify the ethnopluralist component.  Ethnopluralism is an 
ideology that allows for a non-stigmatized invocation of racist and/or xenophobic 
attitudes (Spektorowski 2003; Rydgren 2004).  Though the FN was not able to 
successfully adopt ethnopluralism—as many FN politicians, Le Pen especially, continued 
to spout racist and xenophobic statements, which undermined the principles of 
he DFp was able to employ ethnopluralism effectively.  
 
3 Out of necessity for clarity in explaining these factors, I separate them into distinct phenomena.  
However, as with most social processes, many of these elements are not entities that are exclusive from one 
another, but are inevitably interconnected and extremely salient and dynamic.  These factors do not 
progress in a neat and causal fashion, nor are they always distinct.  Instead, they often inform one another, 
and occasionally become indistinguishable.   
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Also, the absence of a strong legacy of fascism in Denmark gave the far-right a type of 
flexibility that would have not been available to a far-right party in a nation with a strong 
history of fascist leanings (Kitchelt 1997).  In addition, the structure of the electoral 
system in Denmark is highly proportional; thus, it often results in a parliament 
composition that is reliant on coalition building.  Coupled with the fact that the Social 
Democratic party has gained the most votes of any party in the Danish parliamentary 
elections since 1942, most right-wing parties have ended up moving towards the center to 
accomplish their goals, thus leaving an enormous political cleavage on the right (Kitchelt 
1997).  In addition to those factors listed above, I will also briefly touch on catalytic 
economic, and cultural issues. 
According to Rydgren (2004), the transition of the FrP from an anti-tax 
populist party to a party with a strong anti-immigration platform was enabled by the 
success of the National Front in the 1984 French elections (p. 480).  The FN's victory 
came incrementally, first in regional elections, then in the elections for the European 
Parliament.  Finally, the breakthrough of the FN in the 1986 French National 
Assembly—the Assemblée Nationale—elections rang in a new era of politics in Western 
Europe.  Though there had been political parties with far-right leanings represented in the 
Western European governments in the past, the sheer magnitude of both the number of 
votes received by the FN and the extremity of the message put forth by the party had 
resounding effects throughout the region.  For some, this signaled the ushering in of a 
new and despicable age in which ideas that were undemocratic and often racist had 
become acceptable in society, and, consequently, in the realm of “legitimate” politics.   
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The main components of the successful master frame created by the FN in the 
early 1980s were “being flexible enough to fit (in modified form) in different political 
and cultural contexts” and “being sufficiently resonant with the lived experiences, 
attitudes and preconceptions of many people” (Rydgren 2004:478)4.  Rydgren also 
argues that, while the FrP attempted to achieve this, the DFp was the first Danish political
party to use the master frame created by the FN to create a successful radical right p
(2004).  Evidence for this argument can be found in the following examples of how the 
components of the FN master frame were used by each party.   
Unlike the FrP, the DFp avoided invoking fascism or racism, which are both so 
highly stigmatized after World War II, that—for the most part—they poisoned any 
politician that had even a slight nostalgia for either, especially in the Scandinavian 
countries.  Instead of summoning anti-democratic sentiments by glorifying fascism or 
completely rejecting the established political system, the DFp positioned themselves 
between the “political class”—or those that made up the traditional political parties—and 
that which falls outside the boundaries of democracy (Rydgren 2004).  By doing this, 
they effectively removed themselves from that “political class”, as a new and innovative 
alternative to the “same old”; at the same time, they did not breach the sacredness of 
democracy.  Additionally, instead of identifying with racist or xenophobic ideology, the 
DFp embraced the ethnopluralist doctrine, which obfuscates the stigma associated with 
bigoted ideologies by suggesting that there is no hierarchy to the different cultures, but 
 
4 Rydgren (2004) also includes ethnopluralism as a part of his “FN master frame” discussion.  However, 
given the evidence put forth by Spektorowski (2003:116), it seems as though the FN had co-opted this idea 
only after being criticized for being too nationalistic.  Thus, it seems that they were still learning how to be 
a successful far-right party when they put forth the master-frame.  So, while it will be treated as part of the 
master frame, I believe that ethnopluralism was not only developing as part of the FN master frame, but 
took on a life of its own when presented. 
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that they should be preserved—by keeping them geographically separated—out of 
respect for each culture.  Overall, the FrP was able to utilize those lessons that could be 
gleaned from the FN master frame, but did not comprehend the nuanced nature of the 
self-presentation involved in accommodating a complex electorate.  However, the DFp 
had a chance to not only utilize the lessons learned from the master frame, but also to 
observe how the Danish electorate reacted to the FrP’s manifestation of these guidelines.  
The fact that the latter party found more electoral success seems to lend credibility to the 
notion that a far-right party could learn from the successes and downfalls of those that 
came before, thus supporting the idea that the master frame created by the FN acted to 
inform those far-right parties that were able to follow its strategy.  
Denmark does not have a strong history of fascist or extreme right politics.  
Denmark had a Nazi party in the 1930s and 1940s—extreme, but not strong, as it was 
only supported by 2.1 percent of the vote at its peak—and a right-wing “Independent 
Party” in the 1950s and 1960s—not extreme, with a liberal platform favoring the 
bourgeoisie, nor strong, gaining only 2-3 percent (Andersen 1992:193).  Because of this, 
far-right parties in the country could “define the new parties’ appeals without being 
forced to relate to older incarnations of right-wing protest” (Kitschelt 1997:122).  They 
did not have to overcome the stigma typically associated with the far right in those 
countries that had dealt with a significant fascist movement.  In particular, when the FrP 
appeared in the 1973 general elections, they had a clean slate from which to launch their 
party platform.  Further, when the DFp appeared in the 1998 elections, they had only the 
legacy established by the FrP to compete with.  In fact, the lesson learned by Kjærsgaard 
and the other founders of the FrP was that people wanted more extreme policy with less 
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extreme rhetoric.  That is why the DFp is considered to be to the right of the FrP, but also 
considered less outwardly xenophobic.  Kjærsgaard even began to experiment with this 
idea before leaving the FrP.  As a nod towards the outward xenophobia expressed by the 
early FrP, but in an effort to distance her interpretation of the party from the audacity 
exhibited by Glistrup, Kjærsgaard once made a statement about immigrants “multiplying 
like rabbits”; this occurred eleven years after a local representative of the FrP had been 
fined for stating that immigrants were “multiplying like rats” (Andersen 1992 198-199).  
Overall, this strategy has primarily been advantageous in the formation of radical-right 
parties in Denmark.  It has enabled them to employ dexterity in their formation and 
presentation by having large degree of control over their self-presentation, and over their 
ability to meet the needs presented by the electorate.  
 Denmark’s political structure is very open, extremely proportional, and, therefore, 
very reliant on coalition-building.  As a result, compromise is a cornerstone of Danish 
politics.  Kitschelt (1997) argues that because of this, there had been a long-standing 
trend of the center-right parties to negotiate with and to collaborate with the left parties 
that have traditionally held power in Denmark.  As a result, there has been a vacuum on 
the far-right side of the spectrum.  This provided a tremendous opportunity for any party 
that could sufficiently represent far-right voters.  It was this aperture, or cleavage, that 
allowed for Mogens Glistrup to successfully burst upon the scene with his FrP in 1973.  
Glistrup positioned the FrP far enough to the right that it attracted many right-leaning 
voters that had felt disenfranchised when the previous right-wing parties made 
concessions towards the center for the sake of compromise.  According to Kitschelt, 
“right-wing voters became inclined to abandon their customary party choice and 
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experiment with new maverick parties” because they no longer felt represented in by the 
established right-wing parties (1997:124).   
While there was no dramatic increase in immigration that sparked the anti-
immigrant sentiment in the 1980s, it is the case that the composition of the incoming 
immigrant population had significantly changed.  According to Betz: 
In Denmark, for example, between 1982 and 1991 the number of foreigners from 
Scandinavia and the EC countries increased slightly from 46,000 to 51,000.  At 
the same time the number of Africans and Asians increased from 19,000 to over 
45,000 (1993:416). 
 
Some scholars have suggested that it was this influx of non-western immigrants—with 
cultures very different from Danish culture—that spurred this recent wave of resistance 
towards immigrants and immigration policy that is perceived as non-restrictive.  Rydgren 
notes,  “immigrants are conceived of as a threat to the homogeneous and peaceful Danish 
nation, as well as to the Danish culture and norms” (2004: 481).  Because this new wave 
of immigrants has a very different culture—and also because they are more easily 
identified than immigrants from western countries because of the difference in their 
physical features—there has been significantly more resistance to immigration.  
Additionally, the new immigrant population was mostly composed of refugees, as 
opposed to the guest workers, which made up the majority of the immigrant population 
before the 1970s.  Since asylum seekers are not permitted to seek employment, this 
population was perceived as unproductive.  Because of this, immigrants were often 
viewed as a drain on social welfare systems.  This added to the stigmatization of asylum 
seekers, and, thus, immigration in general. 
In the case of Denmark, there was no specific economic downturn that sparked 
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anti-immigrant sentiments among the citizenry.  But, this time period—1980-2005—was 
characterized by a “socioeconomic dislocation due to a structural change in production 
systems, the internationalization of economic competition, and the crisis of the welfare 
state” (Kitchelt 1997: 39).  Additionally, the structure of the highly-redistributive welfare 
state is often invoked as a justification of an anti-immigrant stance, as it is believed that 
immigrant populations are a drain on social assistance programs; this is also known as 
welfare chauvinism (Geddes 2003; Nannestad 2004).  Also, as Bjørklund and Andersen 
(1999a) suggest, since economic prosperity was not only had by the working-class when 
the social democratic party was the incumbent, but also during times of bourgeoisie 
incumbency, working-class voters identify their political alliance based on ideology, not 
economic policy.    
In the case of the DFp, a radical shift effect took place (see Figure 1, number 2).  
In response to a strong upsurge in electoral support for her party, Kjærsgaard maintained 
a combination of pro-welfare state but anti-immigration ideologies in the DFp platform.  
Without the hindrance of a Nazi past and by keeping the anti-immigrant rhetoric 
relatively low key, Kjærsgaard was able to bring the conservatives to their side, thus an 
RSE. Both the KF and the V began to adopt the causes of DFp.  Additionally, the DFp 
“achieved an important role in Danish politics, supporting the existing government of the 
Liberal Party and Conservative People's Party, without actually being a part of the 
government” (“Denmark”).  As a result, the DFp has continued their presence in the 
conservative coalitions to the present, while the Austrian FPÖ has had brief success, 
fissured, and then sputtered out of the coalition. 
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 Denmark has experienced some dramatic changes in the past few decades.  First 
of all, it went from having one of the most liberal immigration policies in Western 
Europe to having one of the most restrictive.  Additionally, it went from a fifty-nine year 
legacy of Social Democratic incumbency, to being controlled by a conservative coalition.  
In fact, “because of the Danish tradition of minority government, the DFp is one of the 
few populist radical right parties that are not formally part of the government, but that 
does officially weigh heavily on it” (Mudde 2007:43).  Since 1973, there has been at least 
one far-right party represented in the Danish parliament.  From 1988 onward, there has 
been at least one far-right party with an anti-immigration platform represented in the 
Danish parliament.  In this work, I argue that several specific factors have contributed to 
enabling these far-right parties to get into parliament.  First of all, the master frame 
established by the FN established a template that far-right parties could follow, enabling 
them to balance the identities of anti-establishment and anti-immigration without 
invoking the stigma associated with fascism and racism.  Additionally, the absence of a 
fascist legacy in Denmark enabled far-right parties to introduce themselves on their own 
terms, and gave them a certain flexibility, which allowed them to meet the needs of the 
Danish electorate.  The political structure of the Danish electoral system also created a 
political cleavage on the right side of the spectrum, as the traditional right-wing parties 
had typically moved towards the center to achieve a compromise.  This provided an 
opportunity for a far-right party to present itself as a viable opportunity to those who felt 
underrepresented by the established right-wing parties.  At the same time, the Danish 
economy, which had been heavily dependent on the global economy, fell victim to the 
effects of globalization, furthering the cause of the anti-immigration parties who could 
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use immigrants as the scapegoats for economic downturn. Lastly, because the 
composition of the immigrant population changed after the guest-worker program had 
been ended in the 1970s, the immigration issue seemed magnified to those who had not 
noticed the fair-skinned immigrants from nearby countries, but noticed the influx of 
immigrants from non-western countries that practiced significantly different cultures than 
the Danish. Additionally, because many of these immigrants were asylum-seekers, there 
was the perception that they were going to be significant consumers of social assistance, 
thus compelling people to support a platform of welfare chauvinism.  
Austria 
Austria has long been a nation of conflicted identity.  Its establishment as a 
sovereign nation came after World War I under strict guidelines from the Allied Powers, 
guidelines that not only prevented its merger with Germany, but also forbade reference to 
Germany in the name of the sovereign nation (Goode 1922).  This left the occupants of 
this infant nation imbued with nostalgia for the days of the Empire, while simultaneously 
stunned by the forced disassociation with the German culture.  It was this ambiguous 
identity that dominated many Austrians until Germany annexed Austria in 1938.  What 
happened at this point is a highly debated topic.  However, it is the very topic of this 
debate that has furthered the identity confusion until contemporary times.  This identity 
confusion compounded with political disenchantment as a result of the clientelist nature 
of the government and a European wave of neo-liberalism—among other factors—to 
create an atmosphere conducive to the success of a radical right party with a carefully 
calculated leader willing to capitalize on any opportunity he was given to rally the anti-
system votes.   
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The Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs [FPÖ]), formed in 
the mid-1950s, after the Federation of Independents merged with two other right-wing 
organizations.  The constituency of the party fluctuated quite a bit from the 1950s to the 
1980s, from ex-Nazis to liberals, from those trying to avoid supporting the Social 
Democratic Party of Austria (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs [SPÖ]) to those 
trying to avoid the ÖVP as the juggernaut of the Catholic Church.  Jörg Haider took 
control in 1986, and, “brought the party out of obscurity” (Hossay 199:318).  However, 
there was some fallout as a result of this new leader.  The coalition the FPÖ had been in 
with the SPÖ collapsed, as they saw Haider as xenophobic, and taking the FPÖ in a 
direction with which they did not want to be aligned.  Despite this consequence, the FPÖ 
seemed to be making vast electoral strides, as Haider was elected governor of Carinthia 
1989, though he had to give up this position in 1991, after making statements openly 
admiring the labor policies of Hitler.  Though there were occasionally some costs to 
espousing such vehement rhetoric—whether it was xenophobic, anti-European Union, or 
anti-partocratic—for the most part the FPÖ continued to gain power with Haider at the 
helm.   (See Appendix A, Table 3 for ÖVP and FPÖ seat holdings for 1980-2005.)   
 The Austrian People's Party (Österreichische Volksparteir [ÖVP]) is more 
moderate than its conservative counterpart, the FPÖ.  Founded as a Christian democratic 
party at the outset of the Federal Republic of Austria in 1945, the ÖVP has remained 
socially and economically conservative.  Throughout the post-war period, up until the 
1990s, the ÖVP and the SPÖ traded off leadership, sometimes forming coalitions, 
sometimes forming oppositional governments.  It was this arrangement that fostered the 
resentment towards the “grand coalition” upon which Haider and the FPÖ capitalized. 
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that the “master case” of the n
                                                       
(See Appendix A, Table 3 for ÖVP party seat holdings for 1980-2005.) 
While the FPÖ has many characteristics in common with other radical right 
political parties, it also bases its appeal in opposition to circumstances not found in many 
other cases.  According to Kitschelt, in Austria, “‘partocratic’ regimes with highly 
politicized economies penetrated by relations of patronage and clientelism” existed, and 
in turn, the FPÖ was able to submerge their appeal “in a broader populist antistatist 
message that emphasizes market liberalism more than authoritarian themes and rallies a 
much more encompassing social coalition than the master case” 5(1997:47).  So, instead 
of having a strong unwavering platform, at least part of the reason for the success of the 
FPÖ is the agility it engages in moving from one current matter to another, adopting 
issues as they become relevant to voters.  Kitschelt cites, “the advent of postindustrial 
society with an explosion of advanced education and instruction and related occupations 
has increased the share of highly trained, politically sophisticated citizens who demand a 
more transparent and participatory political process” (1997:161.)  So, along with the far-
right voters that the FPÖ monopolizes, it was able to represent an alternative to the 
deeply entrenched clientelist system that was becoming antiquated, according to many.  
Betz concludes that, “[t]he rise of the FPÖ was thus primarily a reflection 
of…disenchantment with the established political parties and politics in general” 
(2002:65).   
The economy was another institution on which the FPÖ was able to represent an 
alternative to the well-established, but somewhat archaic status quo.  Kitschelt observes 
ew radical right is a party with an ideology that, 
 
5 Kitschelt later defines “partocracy” as, “a term used to indicate the fusion of state , party, and economic 
elites in politic-economic networks characterized by patronage, clientelism, and corruption” (1997:161). 
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“combine[s] a commitment to capitalist markets with an emphasis on social order, 
authority, stability, and cultural homogeneity” (1997:47).  This appealed to voters in 
Austria because they had had market controls over many aspects of the economy, they 
had industry- and country-wide wage bargaining, and they had many different scandals 
within the social partnership of business, labor, and the SPÖ.  They wanted to have a 
much more open economy, especially after the fall of communism.  However, when 
times were tough and globalization and the fall of communism had their combined 
effects, the FPÖ would revert back to protectionism.  Without those threats, though, they 
generally preferred open markets.  Also, the neo-liberals had foreign examples from 
Thatcher, Reagan, and even Helmut Kohl.  Thus, neo-liberal political thought and neo-
classical economics provided a strong context for the support of neo-liberalism.   
The electoral system in Austria also played a role in the rise of the FPÖ. 
Proportional representation allows small parts to get a foothold in the parliament and then 
publicize their message to a much larger audience.  In other words, proportional 
representation allowed the FPÖ to get massive publicity, especially with a charismatic 
leader. 
 Betz asserts that consociational arrangements played a significant role in the 
electoral breakthrough of the FPÖ (2002:67).  Because a significant Slovenian-speaking 
minority exists in the Austrian state of Carinthia, there had long been tension regarding 
minority rights laws in this area.  In particular, there had been controversy surrounding 
the bilingual signs in traditional Slovenian-settled areas.  Haider has used this issue to 
bolster his campaign, fighting against minority rights in Carinthia.   
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 Jörg Haider became the charismatic—albeit inflammatory—leader of the FPÖ in 
1986.  He remained in this position formally, until 2000, when, during the beginnings of 
the coalition that was established between the FPÖ and ÖVP, he “bowed out as FPÖ 
chairman, being succeeded by the new Vice-Chancellor, Susanne Riess-Passer. He 
nevertheless remained effective leader of the party” (“Austria” 2005).  He remained so 
until 2005, at which time he—along with several important FPÖ members—formed a 
breakaway party, the Alliance for the Future of Austria (Bündnis Zukunft Österreich 
[BZÖ]) in reaction to a chain of events that had resulted from the significant decline in 
support the FPÖ. 
To capture the effect of Jörg Haider on the FPÖ, and Austria, is difficult; to 
summarize it is almost impossible.  As Sully states in her book, one of several that 
explore the Haider phenomenon in great depth, “Haider’s greatest talents were his 
versatility, his powers of persuasion and his ability to communicate and entertain.  The 
Haider phenomenon relied on rhetorical genius combined with a flair for sensing what 
was rotten in the country” (1997:203).  Haider was able to take the FPÖ from stigmatized 
obscurity and make it the second most powerful party in the county in little over a 
decade.  He found a way to appeal to mainstream voters that felt alienated by the 
clientelist nature of the Austrian partocratic system, while simultaneously appealing to 
the traditionally right-leaning constituents.  He was also able to capitalize on a nationalist 
faction in society, by employing xenophobic rhetoric in calculated ways.  Haider’s 
charisma and political savvy not only propelled him to party leadership, it also facilitated 
the rise the FPÖ within Austria. 
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Because of the many hats Haider wore, he was able to at times appeal to 
conventional voters, while, at other times, invoke the most stigmatized of positions.  
Because of this, the FPÖ had a monopoly of neo-fascist votes.  According to Kitschelt, 
right-wing parties in Austria, “had been represented in the legislation almost since the 
founding of the new republics after World War II, and they have drawn on distinctly 
antidemocratic legacies and political constituencies” (1997:159).  As there was no out-
spoken figure further to the right of Haider, the FPÖ got the support of far-right wing 
voters. 
Betz suggests that, given the success of the reform program instituted by the SPÖ-
ÖVP grand coalition to deal with Austria’s transition from an industrial to a post-
industrial economy, “it was hardly economic reasons that account for the FPÖ’s dramatic 
rise in the late 1980s” (2002:64).  Consequently, in the 1990s, Austria, “emerged from 
the difficult process of internationalization…” without a major crisis, and, “continually 
managed to combine low unemployment with a reasonably solid economic performance” 
(Heinisch 2005:1).  However, there are two arguments for the influence of economics.  
While it may have been the case that actual economic hardships compared to the rest of 
Europe were not particularly great, there is some correlation of FPÖ power with 
unemployment.  For instance, unemployment from 1980 to 1992 went from 1.2% to 
2.7%, which is rather low.  However, in 1993 it jumped to 3.9% and then to 4.5% in 1998  
(See Appendix A, Table 4).  In assessing the role socioeconomic factors play in the 
electoral achievements of radical right parties, Givens found, “it would appear that some 
combination of unemployment and foreigners is positively related to the vote for the FPÖ 
in Austria” (1999:151). 
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Second, it could be the case that the perception of impending hardships 
influenced the behavior of voters.  Weiss states that it is the, “[f]ear of modernization 
(‘globalization’) in the population upon which nationalist attitudes, xenophobia, and 
radical right-wing political notions are theoretically founded” (2003:379).  Additionally, 
“[a] strong national leader promises protection against the inherent insecurities of 
pluralism in the economic and political spheres” (Weiss 2003: 379).  Thus, given that the 
rest of Europe was experiencing adjustment crises during this transitional period.   
Unemployment fears could be exacerbated by (1) the fall of communism and immigration 
from those former communist countries, and (2) Austria’s entry into the European Union 
in 1995 which allows a large portion of European workers to come to Austria to find 
work.    
According to Betz, the FPÖ did not initially make, “immigration the central focus 
of its programmatic appeal.  In fact, it was not until the late 1980s that [the FPÖ] adopted 
the question of immigration as a political issue” (2002:63).  In 1989, shortly after the Iron 
Curtain had been lifted, Viennese city officials began to court multinational corporations, 
in an effort to secure Vienna as their “Gateway to the East” as a, “pivotal trading center 
for western exporters and a preferred location for new trade and services-related 
investments” (Nove et al. 2001:132).  It was at this time that the FPÖ capitalized on the 
fear of the Viennese selling out the country as a gateway to the east by appealing to some 
Austrians’ propensity for xenophobia.  Betz states, in 1991, “51 percent of the [Austrian] 
population associated foreign immigrants with rising unemployment” (1994:85).  The 
time was ripe for the type of rhetoric employed by Haider, as he was prepared to use 
foreigners, or even those Austrian’s perceived to be of another culture, as scapegoats.  
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It is also Austria’s own misconceived sense of culture that has shaped the political 
acceptance of the FPÖ.  Near the end of World War II, the Allies painted Austria as the 
first victim of Hitler by the Moscow Declaration, which had been formulated near the 
end of World War II (1943), “to encourage massive resistance in the Ostmark” (Bischof 
2004:18).  However, many Austrians waged little resistance to the Third Reich.  But 
years later “the founders of the Second Republic had to meet the expectations of the 
Moscow Declaration in order to prove that Austria had been the first” victim of Hitler6 
(Bischof 2004:19).  The significance of the Austrian identity forged at this point—the 
myth of Austria as a “victim nation” or opfernation—is extensive in its repercussions.  In 
the 1960s, Bruno Kreisky, an Austrian Jew and Social Democratic, was elected 
Chancellor in Austria.  He had a very long and illustrious career in building the welfare 
state and neo-corporatist arrangements.  It would have appeared that the Austrians had 
successfully used the ‘victim’ argument and had engaged in enough denazitification.    
However, this began to fall apart in the 1980s.  First of all, Dr. Kurt Waldheim 
served as the Secretary General of the United Nations, and then ran for and became 
president of Austria.  Then the country’s white-washing of Austrian participation in the 
Third Reich, and Waldheim’s service as an officer in the Nazi military (allegedly sending 
prisoners to their deaths in concentration camps) would later come back to haunt the 
nation.   In the late 1980s, during this presidential campaign the “Waldheim affair” 
became headline news.  Bischoff suggests, “that were it not for international pressure, 
 
6 It is not my intent here to imply that all or even most Austrians of the First Republic were “willing 
executioners” of the Third Reich.  In fact, Bischof notes, “[d]uring the Anschluss-era many valiant 
individuals engaged in some form of resistance to the Nazi regime, especially Communists and 
Monarchist” (Bischof 2004:18).   
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Austrians still might be living with their ‘conspiracy of silence’ about many of them 
having been perpetrators of and accessories to Hitler's war crimes” (Bischoff 2004:17). 
Also, veterans groups in Austria by definition are connected to the Nazi Regime 
of World War II.  Some of these groups are quite active—the Waffen SS, for instance—
and they are sympathetic to some Nazi accomplishments and ideologies.  In many ways, 
this could be to justify their actions during the war.   Lastly, the children of Austrian 
parents alive during World War II who were born after the war are new victims of a Nazi 
past.  They had no participation in the war or Nazism but they are suspected of it 
nonetheless.  The question becomes whether Nazism becomes a genetic disorder.     
At this same time, Austrians were offered, “Jörg Haider's self-proclaimed 
guardianship against any forces that might destabilize the status-quo appealed to voters,” 
including those attempting to purge the long-held false-victimhood identity through 
works of art and literary pieces (Lamb-Faffelberger 2003:297).  Additionally, as an 
extension of this victimization, Austrian victims were not addressed.  The Austrian 
Federal Government’s response to Jewish demands for reparation and resettlement were 
that they, “regretted not being able to comply because Austria suffered greatly under the 
aggressive acts of the overpowering occupiers” (Lamb-Faffelberger 2003:291). 
Austria has maintained its identity as victim, thus allowing a privileged status, permitting 
the invocation of exploitation or marginalization of minorities, or “other victims”.  Lamb-
Faffelberger writes: 
By simultaneously claiming to be the inheritor of European civilization as well as 
the keeper of a simpler and thus, uncorrupted rural life, it created a notion of 
Heimat Austria that is nothing more than a fetish and as such, a symptom for its 
crippled national and cultural identity (2003:294). 
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Haider and the FPÖ are coming at a time in which they can play the patriarchal role of 
protecting vulnerable Austrians from the hoards of invading foreigners.  
 In the case of the FPÖ, a moderate shift effect has occurred (see Figure 1, number 
4).  Betz states, “[i]n response to the strong upsurge in electoral support for his party, 
Haider embarked on a new course designed to moderate its image in order to present 
himself as a viable candidate for chancellorship” (2002:78).  As the FPÖ became more 
popular, it made the transition from a fringe party to a more conventional party, albeit, 
while Haider still occasionally appealing to xenophobia in the public sphere.  However, 
despite Haider’s purposeful invocation of radicalism, the FPÖ began to move away from 
its vigilante image.  Instead of the ever-changing platform of the mid 1980s to the mid 
1990s, the FPÖ has begun to solidify its stance, as slightly right of the SPÖ.  Thus, as the 
party moved towards the center to gain a larger share of moderate voters, a MSE has 
transpired. 
Overall, the far-reaching success of the FPÖ can be attributed to a wide range of 
factors.  First of all, a vote for the FPÖ was a vote lodging dissent against the long-
standing corporatist rule, scandals, sweetheart deals, and corruption, while 
simultaneously lodging a vote for neo-liberalism in a time that no other party was 
offering this alternative.  Additionally during a time when Austrian’s felt overwhelmed 
by the effects of globalization, the FPÖ represented a lone voice, speaking out against 
foreigners, and the threat of control by the European Union.  Additionally, perceived 
economic hardship as unemployment increased also compelled voters to seek protection.  
Finally, several cultural factors played a role.  As the face of immigration got 
progressively more different, many Austrians felt as if their culture was at risk.  
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Additionally, the identity confusion that still resonated—and was re-invigorated with the 
Waldheim affair, as well as Haider’s tendencies towards Nazi sympathy—facilitated a 
feeling victimhood among many.  Lastly, although quite different, is that this particular 
party centralized around Haider much like the Netherlands centralized around Pim 
Fortuyn.  When Fortuyn was assassinated, the movement died.  The FPÖ may encounter 
a problem of the routinization of charisma.  Haider and the FPÖ came at a time when 
versatility was necessary, presented an alternative, and now are becoming an entrenched 
party of the political system. 
Italy 
Nativism has not played quite the role in Italian politics that it has in many other 
Western European countries.  While it has been invoked by political actors, these 
occasions have resembled its use as a tool, as opposed to a long-term platform.  In fact, 
because of a distinct set of circumstances in Italian society—an intersection of history 
and values—using xenophobic sentiments as a means for mobilizing political support is a 
very slippery slope.  Regardless of this stigma, there have been two Italian right-wing 
political parties to take, at one time or another, an anti-immigrant stance.  The Italian 
Social Movement (Movimento Sociale Italiano [MSI]) and the Northern League (Lega 
Nord [LN]) have both exploited anti-immigrant sentiments as political tools to gain 
support. (See Appendix A Table 5 for right-wing party seat holdings for 1980-2005).  
However, in both cases, the anti-immigrant stance taken by these parties were 
momentary. 
From the end of World War II, until the mid 1990s, Italian politics were 
characterized by a high level of centralization and clientelism.  A significant restructuring 
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of Italian politics occurred in 1993 after the mani pulite—Italian for “clean hands”—
investigation revealed widespread corruption—Tangentopoli—among the politicians and 
the leaders of Italian industry.  Voting policies were changed.  Some political parties 
dissolved, while others shed those members associated with scandal, and reorganized, 
sometimes under a new name.  No part of the Italian political landscape escaped 
untouched by this event.    
 Many of the ideological underpinnings of an anti-immigrationist stance rely on a 
belief in cultural superiority, or racism.  According to Veugelers and Chiarini, “[s]igns of 
nativism bring one dangerously close to accusations of racism, and in Italy razzismo 
rhymes with fascismo, a stigmatizing label that cripples any position to which it can be 
attached” (2002:86).   Thus, one obstacle to the success of an anti-immigration party is 
that the line between legitimacy and the stigmatization associated with anything 
resembling fascism would be very precarious.  Additionally, the strong role Catholicism 
and Socialism have played in Italy, “are also important because their solidaristic and 
universalistic values provide barren ground for xenophobia” (Veugelers and Chiarini 
2002:85).  Also in Italian culture, there is a pervasive sense of communality.  Lastly, 
because of the approach to colonialism fascist Italy took, there is little history of racist 
policies that can be drawn on for nostalgia.  In fact, “[i]n place of the opposition between 
colony and colonizer, fascist Italy offered ‘solidarity’ between ‘a proletarian nation’ and 
‘the poor countries’ in the common struggle against ‘the plutocratic nations’”(Veugelers 
and Chiarini 2002:86).  Italy has, in the past, been portrayed as “the other” by other 
Western European countries.  This has played a role in shaping the perspective of the 
  50
Italian citizenry.  According to Kitschelt, “[i]n Italy, ethnocentrism plays a less important 
role in mobilizing the extreme Right than elsewhere in Europe” (1997:183). 
 Despite these circumstances, Italy—like the rest of Western Europe—is still 
experiencing increased but belated migration from non-European countries.  Betz states 
“…West European countries are confronted with a sizable number of non-Europeans, 
whose physical difference makes an impression far beyond their number. This has 
contributed to the perception that Europe is being ‘invaded’ by alien traditions, culture, 
and religion” (1993:416).  As a result, there exists anti-immigration sentiment amongst 
some of the Italian population, and thus it is fair game for political fodder.   
The MSI was formed after World War II as the fascist party of Italy.  Because of 
the collective memory of Italy’s fascist past, the MSI has remained on the fringes of 
legitimacy.   Because of the nature of the Italian political system, which relies on 
coalition-building and “mediation rather than polarization”, MSI did not gain more than 
8.7 percent of the national vote since their founding in 1946 (Veugelers and Chiarini 
2002:86-88).  The MSI has fared best during times of leftist agitation. 
 Because of their already-marginalized status, the MSI was wary of dabbling in 
anti-immigrationism.  Regarding the strategy of nativism, Vuelgers and Chiarini state, 
“the risk of this strategy was that it might confer a new illegitimacy just when the MSI 
seemed to be shedding its old illegitimacy” (2002:88).  However, the relevance of the 
MSI was waning as the nostalgia for a fascist past that compelled some of their support 
was fading over time.  So, in an effort to reassert itself into political significance, the MSI 
decided to go the way that many other far-right political parties all over Europe were 
going, and take a nativist stance.  Because of the deeply-embedded sense of shared 
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victimhood the MSI had with developing nations—a relic from the fascist-era Italian 
approach to colonialism—the message did not come out clearly.  In fact, throughout the 
late 1980s, despite changing leadership, the MSI continued to take a schizophrenic 
position on immigration that combined an anti-capitalist ideology that appreciated the 
developing world as fellow victims, while simultaneously calling for an end to the 
perceived stampede of immigration.   
Beginning in the late 1980s, the LN was capitalizing on the anti-immigration 
sentiment in Italian society.  As a result of the unstable position of the MSI, and the 
alternative provided by the LN as well as other new political parties, support for the MSI 
continued to decline throughout the early 1990s.  In a time of rampant distrust for the 
traditionalist, clientelist government in Italy, the MSI’s “inability to offer its actual and 
potential constituencies a new program beyond traditional authoritarian appeals” 
hindered the MSI, and as “[a]n entrenched player in a hierarchical and clientelist political 
system, it was an unlikely standard-bearer of populist resentments against partocracy” 
(Kitschelt 1997:169). 
The Northern League was founded in 1991.  It was an alliance formed by the 
numerous regionalist parties of Northern Italy, and headed by Umberto Bossi.  In the 
mid-1980s, “the Venetian and Lombard Leagues, forerunners of the Northern League, 
were barely more than insignificant splinter movements on the fringes of the Italian 
political scene”  (Betz 2002:61).  However, their emphasis on the inefficiencies and 
corruption of the centralized government in Rome seemed to have come at the right 
time—as corruption and scandal became more and more obvious—and propelled them 
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into the political arena.  In 1992, they gained seats in both houses of Italian legislature on 
a pro-federalist platform.   
One of the main tenets of the LN ideology was ethnoregionalism.  According to 
Curran, “[a]t the top of the LN’s agenda was regional autonomy rather than anti-
immigration policies per se” (2004:47).  However, as the LN began to grow, it began to 
change its agenda.  According to Betz, “[i]t was not until Bossi started to seek electoral 
support beyond the party’s strongholds in the north that the party…increasingly focused 
on the ‘invasion of Negroes and Arabs’” (1994:122).  The LN, being a very opportunistic 
party, changed its platform to capitalize on social sentiment.  Regarding Bossi, Curran 
states:  
In a conscious effort to shore up support, he condemned not only southerners but 
also foreign workers, refugees and asylum-seekers, blaming them for rising 
unemployment, crime and the ‘tainting’ of national and regional identities. A 
quick overview of the LN’s policies in the 1980s and 1990s, however, sees it both 
intensifying and moderating its xenophobic pronouncements in response to 
changing electoral moods” (2004:49). 
 
As a result of the wholesale political collapse of 1993, several new political 
parties were created, emphasizing their “cleanliness”, as opposed to the “dirtiness” of the 
corrupt incumbent parties.  Since this encroached on one of the LN’s main selling points, 
they had to find a new identity to compel mass appeal. 
Unfortunately for Bossi, as he began to widen the scope of the LN, he also began 
to lose the core of support in Northern Italy that had been the LN’s power base.  He 
seemed to have lost sight of the initial goals of the LN—regional autonomy—in favor of 
the trendier subject of immigration.  While the LN did achieve electoral gains in the 1996 
elections as a result, they became even more ineffectual at inciting change.  Because of 
the power balance in the legislature, they were unable to manifest any of their federalist 
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goals.  At this point the LN returned to its roots, calling for the succession of Northern 
Italy.  Additionally, they went on to embrace other radical notions, with anti-American 
and anti-European Union stances, while radicalizing their anti-immigrationist stance 
(Betz 2002: 73).   
 Because of the history of fascism in Italy, as well as the “Years of Lead”—a time 
period characterized by terrorist acts committed by extremist group from both the left and 
right in the 1970s and early 80s—there is a general distaste in Italy for most radicalism.  
Thus, as the LN began to embrace a more radical platform, its appeal lessened.  However, 
the LN does play a significant role in the success of right-wing parties in Italy.   
In 2000, the LN rejoined a coalition with several other right-wing parties—The 
House of Freedoms.  In the case of the LN, there is a positive radical flank effect for the 
House of Freedom (see Figure 1, number 1).   While part of the coalition, Bossi’s fiery 
rhetoric provides a contrast to that of Berlusconi’s.  Berlusconi—the Prime Minister and 
head of the House of Freedoms (Casa delle Libertà or CDL) coalition—is known for his 
even-tempered calls for stricter immigration control.  Curran states that Berlusconi has 
“been effective in pursuing tough but popular anti-immigrant policies safe in the 
knowledge that [his] particular stands pale against the more strident approaches of [his] 
populist rivals” (2004:54).  By keeping Bossi and the LN in the coalition, Berlusconi 
benefits twofold: first, he is able to reap the appeal of the extreme anti-immigration 
message that is spouted by the LN since they are in a coalition together; secondly, his 
actions are seen as more reasonable compared to the proposed policies of the LN.  
Overall, both parties benefit.  Specifically, though, the moderate party benefits from the 
contrast it represents from the radical party, thus a +RFE has occurred.   
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Italy has a very complex cultural and political landscape.  On one hand, Catholic 
and Socialist legacies reinforce a communal value system, and emphasize familial 
relationships above all else.  On the other hand, the desire for law and order, and a stable 
government temporarily overwhelmed this value system, as a reaction to the corruption 
revealed in the Tangentopoli scandal.  Additionally, as with the rest of Europe, Italy is 
going through a transition into a global marketplace, and with tensions high, is also 
experiencing increased levels of international immigration and unemployment.  All of 
this compounds to form a very complex political citizenry, and an even more complex 
system of political parties.  
 
Conclusion 
 In all three countries—Denmark, Austria, and Italy—an anti-immigration party 
has become a part of, or a significant support to the government.  The circumstances in 
each country were quite different.  With varying legacies, economic situations, and 
political processes, among other things, each anti-immigrant party took a distinct path to 
its eventual inclusion in or supporting role to the ruling coalition. 
In Denmark, the DFp was able to capitalize on the mistakes made by both the FN 
and the FrP, and construct a more radical anti-immigration party, while appealing to a 
wider swath of the electorate by embedding its message in an ethnopluralist platform 
with populist undertones.  Since there has been no powerful fascist party in Denmark, the 
DFp had no fascist legacy with which to be compared to, nor a stigma from the past to 
overcome.  Additionally, an aperture was created on the right by other right-wing parties, 
as they were dependent on cooperation with the frequently-in-power Social Democrats 
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because the highly proportional electoral system in Denmark regularly creates an 
arrangement conducive to and dependent on coalition building.  Thus, the DFp was able 
to satiate an unfulfilled need by taking an uncompromising right-wing, anti-immigration 
stance.   
In Austria, a very different—and much more vast—set of circumstances 
culminated in the significant success of the FPÖ.  First, many voted for the FPÖ as a vote 
for neo-liberalism and a vote in opposition to corporatist rule, scandals, and corruption.  
Also, to many voters the FPÖ signified a vote in favor of Austrians, and opposed to 
immigration from Eastern Europe and to the power of the European Union.  Additionally, 
the perception of economic hardship also compelled voters to seek security from the 
protectionist FPÖ, as unemployment increased.  Next, a resounding sense of identity 
confusion in Austria—rooted in the dual identity of the shared culture with Germany felt 
by many Austrians, and that of opfernation, the identity of Austria as the first victim of 
the Third Reich—had been reinvigorated by the Walheim affair, which left some voters 
feeling a sense of victimhood, which Haider willingly exploited. The cult of personality 
that surrounded Haider also aided in the appeal of the FPÖ.  He was able to 
simultaneously seem young and in-touch with voters while also appealing to them as a 
paternal figure, willing to do whatever necessary to save Austrians from those forces he 
deemed destructive.   
Lastly, in Italy, a combination of religious and political heritage united with the 
revelations of significant corruption to create the set of circumstances in which the LN 
became a part of the government.  The Catholic and Socialist histories in Italy created a 
value system which emphasized empathy and collectivity.  In contrast, after the 
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Tangentopoli corruption scandal, the Italian people were focused on establishing a stable 
and clean government that would emphasize law and order.  Simultaneously, Italy—
along with the rest of the world—was adjusting to the changes caused by the quickening 
pace of globalization which resulted in higher level of non-European migrants, and also 
rising levels of unemployment.   
In Denmark, the FrP was the forerunner in anti-immigration politics.  However, 
the DFp was able to learn from the mistakes by the FrP, and effectively invoke an 
ethnopluralist master frame.  The electoral success achieved by the DFp resulted in a 
RSE, as the moderate parties began to adopt the anti-immigration stance of the DFp in an 
effort to regain constituents.  In Austria, the FPÖ achieved significant success.  In turn, 
because of the strange combination of nostalgia for the German identity as well as the 
victim of the Third Reich identity, the FPÖ was required to negotiate a slippery slope.  As 
a result, the FPÖ moderated its message while retaining undercurrents of xenophobia.  
Thus, in Austria, a MSE has occurred.  Finally, in Italy a +RFE occurred.  When 
Berlusconi’s party accepted the LN into a coalition, it adopted all of the constituents of 
the LN, while simultaneously appearing to moderate the rogue party.  Thus, Berlusconi’s 
party benefited twofold.   
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Chapter 4:    Countries in Which Strong Anti-immigrant Parties Do Not Enter the 
Government: France and Belgium 
 The two countries in this chapter had strong anti-immigrant parties, but they have 
not taken control of the national government.  However, significant spurts of support for 
the radical anti-immigration party in France have caused some interesting political 
phenomena to occur.  In the case of Belgium, the bifurcation of the country and its 
government has led to a dualistic political landscape. 
France 
 The political history of France is characterized by a great deal of activism on 
behalf of democracy and human rights.  From the French Revolution in the late 1700s to 
the Free French Forces of World War II, the struggle waged by the French against 
perceived tyranny or injustice has been virulent.  However, as one of the tenets of 
democracy is free speech, the French—as with many other modern democratic nations—
have experienced political participation by bombastic xenophobic radicals, in particular 
the National Front (Front National [FN]).  Furthermore, some French voters have seen 
the existence of the FN as an opportunity for an alternative to the political and social 
unrest they associate with the conventional parties, and reacted by casting their vote for 
the radicals, as opposed to the traditional political parties.  However, despite these 
votes—as well as the small, radical right support-base—the FN has not managed to gain 
significant power at the national level.  It should be noted, however, that the success 
achieved by the FN in the 1980s was—and still is—considered remarkable, as they had 
been the first far-right political party to achieve any success with ideologies that so-
closely resemble the biological racism associated with fascism.    
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It can be argued, however, that their presence has been a catalyst for some actions 
taken by the moderate right wing, in an attempt to reassert themselves as viable to their 
constituents.  The support that has been shown for the FN has caused both national and 
international uproars over the participation of quasi-fascist politicians in democratic 
political systems, but has also—as probably intended by those manifesting their feelings 
of inadequacy with the existent political parties—shaped public and political discourse, 
thus calling more attention to the tensions that have been building in a country well-
known for their emphasis on assimilation of immigrants into French culture.  Overall, 
several factors can account for the intermittent success of the FN, including structural 
issues such as a the proportional voting system used in the parliamentary elections of 
1986, as well as the onslaught of media coverage of the outspoken lead of the FN, Jean-
Marie Le Pen.  Additionally, the general discontent with the economic downturn 
experienced in the early and mid-1980s has played a role, while the feeling of unease 
amongst those uncomfortable with the proximity and magnitude of the non-European 
immigrant population has had an impact on voting practices, particularly among unskilled 
workers.  However, though one could argue that the FN has become institutionalized in 
French politics and has had an impact on the political landscape, it should be noted that 
they have not achieved considerable representation in the French parliament.   
The FN was formed in 1972 founded on an anti-immigration platform with 
emphasis on law and order, and free-market capitalism (“France” 2005).  Additionally, 
the FN emphasized traditional values.  Though Le Pen, himself, vacillated on the issue of 
religion throughout the mid-70s, in 1978 he embraced it, along with a clearly socially 
conservative approach to women’s rights, including abortion rights (Kitschelt 1997).  It 
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was not until the European parliamentary elections of 1984 that the FN achieved a 
notable electoral victory.  In those elections they won 11.2 percent of the vote, with 
particularly high percentages in towns that had been hit hard by deindustrialization and 
had large immigrant worker populations, particularly the town of Dreaux, with 19.1 
percent (Bréchon and Mitra 1992).  The election of ten FN members to the European 
parliament gained national and international attention.  The momentum from that success 
combined with a set of unique circumstances propelled the FN into relevance in the next 
French legislative elections.  First of all, though there was a significant outcry in reaction 
to this party whose leader was known to make public xenophobic and anti-Semitic 
remarks, the attention did quite a bit to legitimatize the FN by spreading its message in 
the context of their success in the European parliamentary elections.  Secondly, after the 
Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste, {PS]) took control of the presidency and the legislature 
in 1981, the “Gaullist-Giscardian (RPR-UDF) right adopted an aggressive, radicalized 
discourse which narrowed the ideological ground between the right and the extreme right, 
and in effect, played into the hands of and legitimated the FN as the radical wing of 
opposition to the incumbent left” (Hainsworth 1992:41).  
Also, the 1986 legislative elections were held with a new proportional ballot, 
introduced by François Mitterrand, leader of the French Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste 
[PS]).  Proportional ballots tend to favor smaller parties, as opposed to the two-round 
majoritarian system, which favors larger parties with more widespread support bases.  
Additionally, “France experienced a generalized crisis of confidence in the established 
parties in the mid-1980s (Kitschelt 1997:98).  Thus, in the 1986 legislative election, the 
FN gained 35 seats in the National Assembly, by far the largest representation in the 
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legislation the party would ever achieve in the two decades that this study focuses on.  In 
the subsequent election, the support for the FN did not dramatically drop, but did not 
yield the same legislative representation as it had returned to the “two-round majoritarian 
system [which] encourages party fragmentation” (Kitschelt 1997:102).  In the 1993 
French National Assembly elections the FN lost their representation, only to regain the 
one seat in 1997. (See Appendix A, Table 7 for FN seat holdings for 1980-2005.) 
The two strongest moderate right-wing parties from 1980-2005 have been Rally 
for the Republic (Rassemblement pour la République [RPR]) and Union for French 
Democracy (Union pour la Démocratie Française [UDF]).  The RPR was a Gaullist 
party until the early 1980’s when it adopted a free-market policy.  The UDF was a center-
right party.  Both parties expressed apprehension towards allying with the FN at the 
national level, though they permitted alliances to be made at the regional level to defeat 
the French left. (See Appendix A, Table 7 for RPR and UDF seat holdings for 1980-
2005.) 
Some of the electoral success achieved by the FN can be attributed to the fact that 
the FN offered a new and novel option to the conventional system (Bréchon and Mitra 
1992; Hainsworth 1992).  In the case of the 1984 European Parliamentary elections, 
voters were able to lodge their discontent with the established parties by voting for the 
radical FN.  Consequently, having secured 11.2 percent of the vote in the European 
Parliamentary elections legitimized the party to a degree, thus resulting in further 
viability in many voters’ eyes (Bréchon and Mitra 1992).   
Additionally, Le Pen has run for the presidency multiple times, achieving what 
some saw as an amount of support indicative of disturbing xenophobic sentiment in the 
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French population in the first round of voting in both 1995 and 2002—15.00% and 
16.86% respectively (Gemie 2003).  While the latter event is beyond the scope of this 
study, both of these numbers substantiate the notion that the FN—while mostly 
unsuccessful nationally—has a significant support base and is entrenched within the 
French political landscape.   
 It would be misleading to cast votes for the FN as votes against the system.  It is 
the case that there is a constellation of values propagated by the FN that finds merit with 
many voters.  While, “[t]he electors of the National Front appear to be much more 
xenophobic than the average voter” according to Bréchon and Mitra (1992:70), these 
voters are not the only constituency attracted to the FN.  According to Kitschelt (1997) 
those supporters who identify primarily with the racist ideologies of the FN are 
“outweighed by a traditional rightist group footed in the Gaullist party and more 
concerned with free markets as well as by Catholic fundamentalists…”  (p. 105).  
Additionally, they have enjoyed periods of support directly correlated with specific 
instances highlighting particular social issues.  For example, “in October 1989 the 
incident of the ‘Islamic headscarf’ created a national stir and helped mobilize opinion in 
favor of the National Front” (Bréchon and Mitra 1992:66).  Also, in later years, one of 
the primary appeals of the FN was how contrasting its policies were with the “themes of 
‘decentralization’ and ‘right to difference’ which were important themes during fourteen 
years of Socialist cultural policy” (Ingram 1998:804).    
The primary reason that the FN has never gained a stronghold in politics in France 
is because most of the voters of France do not want views that are so antithetical to the 
traditions of French democracy represented with any significant power in the 
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government.  Voting for the FN can send a powerful message to the traditional political 
parties.  According to Bréchon and Mitra, 
their very presence in the midst of functioning democracies raises a cruel dilemma 
of how far to tolerate the intolerant without seriously compromising the 
institutions of free speech and full freedom of political action and association and 
of where to draw the line between the values of ethnic identity and exclusiveness, 
on the one hand, and liberty and human rights, which are the essence of 
liberalism, on the other (p.63). 
 
Thus, while there is a small electorate that agrees with the platform of the FN, there is 
significant resistance towards its extremism by many, as can be seen from the mass 
outpouring of resistance to his first-round electoral success in the presidential election in 
2002 (see Gemie 2003).  Additionally, powerless immigrants are not the only victims of 
attack by Le Pen.  According to Hainsworth, “the FN conjures up a motley collection of 
scapegoats: communists, socialists, liberals, the media, Freemasons, homosexuals, 
progressive clergy, technocrats, bureaucrats, grands écoliers, AIDS carriers, intellectuals, 
and so on.  Wherever possible, these too are portrayed as aliens or malevolent forces” 
(1992:50).  And in contrast to the fact that occasionally current events boost the support 
for the FN—as mentioned above regarding the headscarf affair—they can also, in turn, 
hurt the FN, reminding society of the precariousness of hate speech.  Bréchon and Mitra 
cite that, “[i]n a poll taken by BVA for the French television… 52 percent thought that 
the National Front constituted a danger to democracy” (1992:79). Although Rydgren 
claims that the FN created a two-fold master frame that included ethnopluralist ideologies 
adopted from the “Nouvelle Droite” and another element, “the populist anti-political 
establishment strategy, from the populist Poujadist movement” (Rydgren 2004), I would 
argue that if the FN intended to adopt ethnopluralism, they did not do so effectively 
(p.479).  Ethnopluralism is an ideology that justifies an anti-immigrant stance by 
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embracing the idea that each culture is unique and valuable, thus each culture should be 
maintained by keeping cultures separated (Spektorowski 2003).  To successfully invoke 
ethnopluralism, one cannot embrace xenophobia and racism, as both ideologies imply the 
inferiority of other cultures.  It follows then, that Le Pen and the FN have not successfully 
embraced ethnopluralism.   
An interesting combination of mechanisms has occurred surrounding the FN and 
their fellow right-wing parties.  Both a RSE and a MSE can be seen during the early part 
of this time frame—before 2000, that is—as well a -RFE (see Figure 1).  For instance, 
though the FN did not gain any seats in the French National Assembly elections of 1993, 
the impact of their platform could by seen in “an election campaign in which the 
‘respectable’ centre-right parties took up many of the FN's concerns about immigration 
and the rule of law” (“France” 2005).    And though the center-right parties co-opted the 
message of the FN, “the message sent by all other parties to the voters is clear: the FN is 
a party that is a threat to liberal democracy, and it should therefore be kept away from 
power” (Van Spanje Van Der Brug 2007:1032).  The moderate shift is also obvious in 
that, “the National Front’s members and candidates for the National Assembly have taken 
more moderate positions than the party activists”  (Kitschelt 1997:118).  Here is an 
example of these two parties on the right strategically interacting and recognizing 
multiple strategies at the same time, while the anti-immigrant party never enters the 
coalition.  France can be instructive because it shows how politicians think about these 
strategies.  So, simultaneously, the moderate right parties are “adopting some of its 
objectives and cooperating with the National Front in subnational elections” (Kitschelt 
1997:118), while vilifying their stance as undemocratic, while the National Front is 
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capitalizing on their criticisms of the moderate right parties inability to address issues, 
while moving closer to the ideologies of the moderate right in their legislative campaigns.  
Additionally, a -RFE can be seen in 1995, when some moderate conservatives allied with 
the FN at the regional level, resulting in a backlash.  Moderate conservatives eventually 
severed ties with the FN in an effort to regain support. 
During the 2000-2005 time frame, there is a clear manifestation of a hybrid 
mechanism at work.  According to Minkenberg, in France, there was a “growing 
polarization in the French political spectrum around the agenda of the Front National, that 
is an agenda-setting effect coupled with growing rejection of the FN in the general public 
and countermobilization on the streets” (2002:267).  Thus, as the moderate right-wing 
parties are adopting concern for issues brought to light by the FN, they are also 
simultaneously co-opting the FN’s position on these issues.  And while this is going on, 
they are also capitalizing on the stigma surrounding the FN’s neo-fascist reputation by 
gaining support as the “sensible” party to deal with these issues, as opposed to the FN.  In 
short, the moderate right is adopting a more radical position—a RSE—while they are also 
gaining electoral support as a more rational option than the FN—+RFE.    
While the FN has not had significant representation in the National Assembly, 
save their windfall in 1986, their impact on French politics cannot be ignored.  
Regardless of the actual number of representatives the FN has in the legislature at any 
one time, it is clear that “the party gained increasing influence over the policy agenda, as 
parties of both the Right and the Left attempted to co-opt and gain control of the issues of 
immigration and security”  (Schain 2002:240).  In addition, the existence of the FN has 
mobilized anti-xenophobic sentiment.  Lastly, the FN has caused a more intimate 
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dialogue about French identity, engaging individuals and groups throughout French 
society to interrogate the notion of French culture. 
Belgium 
The complex constitution of Belgian society has begot a very unique political 
system.  Composed of three distinct geographical regions—Wallonia, Flanders, and the 
Brussels metropolitan area—and three distinct cultural groups—the Flemish in northern 
Belgium, including Brussels; the Francophone population in southern Belgium and also 
in Brussels; and a small community of German-speakers in eastern Belgium—there are 
many cross-cutting interests.  Specifically, because of the different cultural experiences, 
courses of economic development, and political histories, the two major cultural 
groups—the Francophone and the Flemish—favor distinct political styles as well as 
policies.  Thus, while anti-immigration parties exist in both Flanders and Wallonia, the 
Flemish Bloc (Vlaams Blok [VB]) of Flanders has achieved considerable success, while 
the National Front (Front National [FN]) in Wallonia has not.  The success of the VB can 
be attributed to a number of factors, including the strength of the pre-existing right-wing 
structure in Flanders which was strengthened by—and, in turn, contributed to—a sense of 
alienation from the political system, xenophobic attitudes among the Flemish, the 
magnitude and nature of media coverage received by the VB and the compulsory voting 
enforced in Belgium. First of all, because of an existing radical right infrastructure 
“embedded in a complex and historically-contingent process of socio-political change” 
and based on Flemish nationalism, the VB was able to simply co-opt the framework—
which included a significant voter-base as well as an anti-government sentiment that 
stemmed from the elitist Francophone-dominated government that existed up until and 
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somewhat even after the 1960s—by using populist appeal (Hossay 1996:343).  Also 
within the nationalist philosophy was exclusionist ideology, which, over time, has 
evolved into a pervasive sense of xenophobia within certain portions of Flemish society.  
Furthermore, the media has had a dual impact: their dismissive attitude towards the VB 
has strengthened the anti-system appeal of the party, while its coverage of the 
sociopolitical issues on which the VB has capitalized has seemingly confirmed their 
problematic status.  Lastly, because Belgium has compulsory voting, the salience of 
issues is more apparent as voters move their vote from one party to another.  (See 
Appendix A, Table 9 for right-wing party seat holdings for 1980-2005.) 
The VB materialized in1978 and debuted in the parliamentary elections of that 
year.  It emerged from a radical split from the People's Union (Volksunie [VU]), and was 
composed, “as a union of the two more extremist nationalist factions, the Flemish 
People’s Party (Vlaams Volkspartij) and the Flemish Nationalist Party (Vlaams 
Nationalist Partij)” (Hossay 2002:320).   The VB was founded on a platform of militant 
Flemish nationalism, but soon, 
“in a search for a platform with greater popular resonance and perhaps learning 
from the success of the anti-immigrant message in France and the Netherlands, 
the VB combined its anti-government program and radical version of the Flemish 
nationalism with rhetoric against immigrants” (Hossay 2002:176).   
 
This move was not a very far ideological leap for a party based on cultural and linguistic 
nationalism.  The anti-immigration platform adopted by the VB in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s catapulted it into viability shortly after adoption.  As can be seen in Appendix 
A, Table 9, the VB achieved major electoral victory in the following elections.   
The VU was a right-wing political party active from 1954 until the fracture of the 
party into new left and right entities in 2001.  As mentioned above, it was from a radical 
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split from this party that the VB was formed.  However, within ten years of the formation 
of the VB, it had surpassed the VU in votes.  Additionally, the VU never held a 
specifically anti-immigration platform, and were only moderately nationalist.   
The two significant moderate right-wing parties that have existed in the Flemish 
political landscape during the scope of this study are the Flemish Liberals and Democrats 
(Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten [VLD], previously the Party for Freedom and 
Progress, or the Partij voor Vrijheid en Vooruitgang [PVV]) and the Christian 
Democratic and Flemish Party (Christen-Democratic and Vlaams [CD&V] previously 
the Christian People's Party or the Christelijke Volkspartij [CVP]).  The VLD was 
founded on a liberal-market policy, which it embraced throughout the early 1980s, but 
shortly thereafter embraced a more centrist economic policy, while holding onto a 
progressive social agenda.  The CD&V embraces and Christian Democratic doctrine, and 
“has always drawn its electorate from Flemish Catholic workers and farmers” 
(“Belgium” 2006).  Of the two moderate right-wing parties mentioned here, the CD&V 
received more support than the VLD, until the 1999 parliamentary elections.  In fact, 
throughout most of the time frame focused upon in this study, the CD&V were either in 
the governing coalition in Belgium, or were the governing party, with the exception of 
the 1987 and 1991 elections.   
Throughout most of the history of Belgium—and even before Belgium was a 
sovereign nation—the public sphere was dominated by Francophone elites.  As Hossay 
states, “the making of Belgium was largely an elite affair, and elites spoke French” 
(1996:348).  It was not until the 1970s, when, “several packages of constitutional 
reforms… led to the transfer of substantial competencies to regions and communities”, 
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thus ultimately giving Dutch-speaking Belgians self-determination in the public and 
political spheres (“Belgium” 2006). These changes culminated in the creation of a federal 
state in 1993.  However, it was a Flemish movement that began to organize before the 
turn of the century that eventually spurred these changes.  This movement began as an 
effort to gain rights on behalf of Dutch-speakers in Belgium, and evolved into a full-
fledged nationalist movement over the course of the following years.   After the First 
World War, universal suffrage was granted, making “the language issue increasingly 
salient to Flemish politicians”, which in turn, “gained increasing support for…demands 
for linguistic reform” (Hossay 2002:166).  Regardless, the Belgian government remained 
dominated by Francophones, and French remained the language of business and politics.  
Over the following two decades, Jewish migrants settled in Flanders and Brussels, 
“stranded on their way to America” (Hossay 2002:166).  As in many cases throughout 
Europe, as soon as an economic downturn occurred—accompanied by the waves of anti-
Semitism that were resonating from the Third Reich—these immigrants became the 
target of anti-Semitism.  Years later, during Nazi occupation, this anti-Semitism—though 
not limited to Flemish nationalists—culminated in collaboration with the German 
occupiers.  In fact, Hossay cites a specific instance in which, “Flemish collaborators who 
had not joined the Flemish SS division sent Antwerp's Jews to the concentration camps” 
(1996:349).  According to Husbands, “[t]he second World War, of course, damaged the 
legitimacy of the extreme right” (1992:130).  As a result, many of the extreme right 
activists were absorbed into more mainstream political parties, or organized outside of 
the scope of mainstream politics.  However, they never completely disengaged.  In fact, 
because of the stigma associated with a systematic denial of rights to a cultural group that 
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was born of this era, Flemish nationalism found more sympathy in post-war society.  
Regarding “a ‘Flemish movement’ in Belgium devoted to the general social and political 
emancipation and cultural self-determination of the Flemish population” Husbands states, 
“it is unsurprising that this nationalism was the seedbed of extreme-right activity or that 
this latter was therefore accorded more tolerance than extreme-right phenomena 
elsewhere in Western Europe” (1992:131).  It was out of this movement that the VB was 
eventually born.  It was the pre-existing infrastructure that meets the “supply” side of this 
equation (De Witte and Klandermans 2000).   Basically, the holdover structures and 
ideologies from every era of Flemish nationalism have culminated to form the VB.  In the 
1970s, “[t]hese militant groups were also ideologically well trained, which facilitated the 
development of a coherent party” (De Witte and Klandermans 2000:704).  Additionally, 
the characteristics that have allowed a focused ideology as well as persistence over time 
are the same characteristics that allow the VB to function well within the contemporary 
political sphere.  According to Swyngedouw and Ivaldi, “their highly centralized 
organization allows them to respond quickly to emerging issues and exploit all new 
political opportunities by changing their electoral platforms” (2001:3).     
Now we move on to the “demand” side of the equation (De Witte and Bert 
Klandermans 2000).   The construction of the “immigrant” has vastly differed between 
the Flemish and Walloon regions in Belgium.  Immigration in Wallonia occurred much 
earlier than in Flanders, and was composed of a different collection of peoples.  The 
Catholic Italian immigrants that came to Wallonia to work in the coal mines were quickly 
assimilated into social and political networks by the Socialist government that had been 
dominant in the region in the post-war era (Hossay 2002).  The results of this social 
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experiment were positive and, “[t]he experience of Italian immigrants set a pattern for the 
incorporation of later immigrants…” (Hossay 2002:171).  However, this proved to be 
true only for Wallonia.  At the time this was occurring in Wallonia, Flanders had little 
need for migrant workers.  According to Hossay, “[i]mmigrants did not begin coming to 
Flemish mines until the 1960s, about the same time Italian migration tapered off in 
Wallonia”, at which time, “[t]he Belgian government…began active recruitment efforts 
in Morocco and Turkey” (2002:171).  Thus, the immigrant population that came to 
Flanders was much different than that which had occupied Wallonia years before.  The 
immigrants were not European, which resulted in a situation in which, 
“these communities were isolated from Belgian society in cultural enclaves with 
virtually no naturalization.  Accordingly, these immigrants and their descendents 
were viewed as gastarbeiters—temporary, distinct, and in no way candidates for 
membership in Flemish society” (Hossay 2002:171).   
 
In a region of the country that had been fighting a nationalist cause, based on cultural and 
linguistic autonomy, multiculturalism was not a widely embraced notion.  This is clearly 
manifested in the support found by the VB in a few short years after the influx of 
immigrants began.  In 1978, the VB split with the VU over an issue concerning the 
Egmont pact—a failed political reform regarding linguistic rights and the conversion of 
Belgium into a federal system.  As mentioned before, the VB was conceived of the 
merger of two radical Flemish national sects, composed mostly of those who viewed the 
VU’s support of the Egmont pact as an abandonment of a Flemish nationalist stance.  As 
mentioned before, it was not long after its formation that the VB expanded its anti-statist, 
pro-Flemish nationalism platform to encompass an anti-immigration stance, possibly 
taking a cue from the FN in France, among other anti-immigrant parties of the time.      
Evidence suggests that the immigration issue is highly influential in voter decision-
  71
making.  Billiet and Witte found in regard to the VB, “a negative attitude toward 
immigrants strongly determines the vote for this party” (2008:264).  In fact, not only does 
the anti-immigration issue play an important role in the success of the VB, Billiet and 
Witte determined that “[e]veryday racism thus motivates political racism in the Flemish 
part of Belgium” (Billiet and de Witt 2008: 253).  This provides sufficient evidence that 
there exists a demand for political mobilization against immigrants in Flanders. 
Evidence suggests that the media has also influenced the success of the VB 
twofold.  First, the disdainful way in which the media covers VB issues and events is said 
to appeal to the anti-system sentiments of some portions of the Flemish electorate.  
Additionally, there is evidence that “media coverage…contributes significantly to VB 
votes”, in particular, there is “a solid association between extreme-right success and 
media coverage of immigration and crime (theft)” (Walgrave and de Swert 2004: 
496,495).  In an “upward spiral”, the attention given to crime and immigration by the VB 
causes an interest in the issues, which causes a demand for media coverage of these 
issues, which in turn, reifies them as problematic social phenomena (De Witte and 
Klandermans 2000).   
In addition to those factors discussed above, there are several minor phenomena 
that are worth mentioning in the success of the VB.   First of all, as a result of 
compulsory voting in Belgium, “no party exists in a vacuum; rather parties interact in a 
hydraulic system of competition in which a loss by one party almost always translates 
into a gain by another” (Hossay 2002: 164-165).  Thus, voting trends and transitions in 
interests have a more obvious impact in Belgium than they may in a country in which a 
voter could simply abstain if discontent.  Additionally, as is found in many cases of 
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extreme right political parties throughout Europe, the VB takes a position of welfare 
chauvinism.  Betz states, “the Vlaams Blok was quick to zero in on the huge financial 
transfer payments raised from Flemish taxpayers to pay for the growing social security 
needs of the Walloons and to cover the growing state deficit…” (1994:137).  Finally, the 
structure of the Belgian political landscape cannot be ignored.  Inevitably, in a country 
that is divided so sharply between cultural and linguistic identities, the political process 
will be disrupted.  In a way, every issue can be related to another, thus causing each side 
to, in some way, be the “Walloon” side or the “Flemish” side, even if these assignments 
are made arbitrarily, or contingent to only a particular situation.  As quoted by Hossay, 
“Aristide Zolberg has noted ‘Belgian politicians have a propensity for identifying almost 
any choice as favoring one of the other of the two language communities; once an object 
is defined as valuable by one side, its opposite becomes valuable to the 
other’”(2002:169).  Overall, the extent to which this political environment is contorted by 
the bifurcation of the country is difficult to determine, but surely exists to a great degree. 
Though in Belgium, the social, economic, and political circumstances are so 
vastly different within each distinct cultural group, it is somewhat difficult to address a 
Walloon political party as if it is even in the same country, given the content of the 
previous paragraph, I feel compelled to discuss the failure of the FN in Wallonia.  In stark 
contrast to the political progression of Flanders, those in Wallonia were represented in the 
political system of Belgium since its founding.  Thus, instead of resentment as a result of 
alienation, the Francophones of Wallonia, for the most part, had their interests 
represented by the entrenched political system of Belgium during most of the time 
Belgium has been a sovereign nation.  Thus, instead of developing their identity in 
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opposition, they developed it in acquiescence.  Additionally, specific socio-historic 
factors have contributed to the strength of the left in Wallonia, and, in turn, the weakness 
of the right.   After the end of World War II, and thus the elimination of radical right 
forces, “[t]he dominance of the left in the postwar government allowed for an 
unprecedented influence by predominantly Francophone socialists who were flush with 
Belgian patriotism after their key role in the resistance” (Hossay 2002:167).  The long-
term results of this Francophone dominance, as well as the association of Belgium 
patriotism with the political left, resonated throughout the political sphere for decades.  
Since Walloon is Belgian, and Belgian is left, “the radical right in Francophone Belgium 
has been unable to exploit either a Belgian or a specifically Walloon sense of national 
identity” (Hossay 2002:164). 
In the case of the VB there seems to be no radical flank effects—positive or 
negative—nor any shift effects—moderate or radical.  There are multiple issues that can 
account for this.  The first is the cordon sanitaire (which means “quarantine line”) put in 
place by the other established political parties in Flanders.  This is an agreement amongst 
these parties that none of them will ally with the VB.  This alone negates a MSE, as the 
cordon sanitaire undermines any chance the VB would have to join a ruling coalition, or 
to even gain a cooperative relationship with one of the traditional political parties.  
Additionally, “the Vlaams Blok has not moderated its rhetoric since its electoral 
breakthrough in 1991” (Breuning and Ishiyam 1998:5).  A RSE has not occurred, either, 
as neither the VLD nor the CD&V have radicalized their message.  The VLD has 
embraced a socially progressive policy since the 1980s.  And Billiet has found that “those 
who are detached from the churches are more likely to support radical parties because 
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they are less integrated into communal social networks and thus less subject to social 
control” and that “Flemish Catholics, and especially the regular churchgoers, traditionally 
are supporters of the Christian Democratic Party” (1995: 320-321).  Next, a brief analysis 
of election results reveals that a +RFE has not occurred.  Since 1981, the share of votes 
attained by the VB has increased significantly every year, the share of votes received by 
the VLD has only increased slightly (less than four percent from the lowest point in the 
elections in 1985, to the highest point in the 1999 elections), while the share of votes 
received by the CD&V has decreased significantly overall.  Lastly, for a -RFE to have 
occurred, a negative association with the radical group—the VB—would have to taint the 
success of the moderate groups—the CD&V and the VLD.  While we did see a decline in 
support for the CD&V it cannot be attributed to its association with the VB as there is no 
association as governed by the cordon sanitaire.  Additionally, the increase—though 
moderate it may be—in support for the VLD negates a -RFE, as does the lack of 
association with the VB.   
The distinct socio-historic circumstances in which Flanders and Wallonia have 
developed—which predate even the nation of Belgium itself—have had an enormous 
impact on the development of partisan politics in the two regions.  Specifically, the 
dominance of the public sphere by French-speakers until the late 20th century had an 
enormous affect on the development of the Flemish national identity.  It was this identity 
forged in opposition that lead to the development of the infrastructure and ideology that 
would eventually culminate in the form of the VB.  Fulfilling the demand side of the 
formula, however, does not complete the picture.  The specific circumstances in which 
the “immigrant” identity was formulated in Flanders also played an essential role in the 
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success of the VB.  They did so by leading to the exclusionary mindset fostered by an 
existing sense of victimhood and nationalism combined with the contrasting cultural 
characteristics held by those immigrants that had first appeared in post-war Flanders.  
Finally, the role of the media in reifying those issues co-opted by the VB, as well as 
reinforcing the anti-system character of the VB cannot be ignored, nor can the appeal of 
welfare chauvinism in Flanders, after having been the subordinate population for so long.  
The character of the political sphere in Belgium is necessarily unique, manifesting as two 
distinct regions, as well as two distinct cultures, but forced to navigate as one monolithic 
force. 
Conclusion 
Both France and Belgium have had strong anti-immigration parties, but neither 
has joined or supported the government.  While the FN of France has influenced anti-
immigration parties all over Europe, it has not managed to gain significant success in the 
French parliament.  In Belgium, the division of the country into Wallonia and Flanders 
has muddled the political landscape.  For all practical purposes, it is two countries with 
two distinct national identities sharing one federal government.   
In France, the FN has undoubtedly had a strong impact on the political scene.  
Whether for good or bad, the FN has been able to call attention to itself and the issue of 
immigration.  While the FN has been—for some voters—an alterative to the entrenched 
political parties, it has also represented an antagonistic force to many French voters.  It 
gave some an alternative to the conventional, while for others, the FN represented an 
anti-Democratic force that must be defeated.  By polarizing voters, the FN was able to 
have a significant impact on elections in France.  In fact, they have achieved more 
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success than any other overtly xenophobic party, specifically in the 1986 parliamentary 
elections—when the FN won 35 seats—and during LePen’s presidential bid in 2002. 
Regardless, the FN was never able to join the government.  However, to dismiss the 
existence of a xenophobic constituency in France would be misleading.    Within the 
conservative factions in France, there were those that supported the FN as a protest 
against the conventional right wing parties, there were those that bolstered their support 
of the moderate right as a protest against the FN, and there were those that supported the 
FN because they also believe that immigrants represent a threat to French identity.  All in 
all, the impact of the FN has been far-reaching, not just on the right in France, but 
throughout Europe.   
In Belgium, the existence of two distinct regions within one nation has shaped not 
only cultural identities, but also political identities.  Each region, Flanders and Wallonia, 
has a separate history.  From the beginning of Belgium statehood, the Francophones of 
Wallonia were far more prosperous than their northern neighbors in Flanders.  
Additionally, the Francophones in Brussels dominated the political sphere.  Although this 
changed in the 1950s and 1960s, the identity of Flanders is heavily based on the 
disenfranchisement of this earlier time.  It is this identity that has contributed to the 
success of the VB.  First, a sense of alienation from the political system contributed to the 
rise of the VB.  Also, preexisting xenophobic attitudes among the Flemish—which 
stemmed from a sense of nationalism fueled by the disenfranchised status of Flanders—
were also a catalyst to its degree of success.  Also, the level and character of media 
coverage received by the VB aided in its electoral achievements.  Finally, the compulsory 
voting enforced in Belgium forced a choice from Belgium voters.  
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Neither the FN nor the VB was able to enter the government, or even play a 
significant supporting role the governing coalition.  However, the interaction that 
occurred among the right-wing political parties in both countries tell a story about the 
role of these interactions have in affecting the dynamic within a political system.  In 
France, both a +RFE and a RSE occur.  They occur simultaneously.  While the moderate 
conservative party co-opts the message of the FN after seeing how many voters this 
message resonated with, this party concurrently accuses the FN of being anti-Democratic.  
The moderate party is able to present its co-opted platform in a less bombastic way than 
LePen, while maintaining support for policies in line with those of the LN, thus gaining 
support for the policies, while, at the same time, gaining support for being a more 
reasonable alternative than the FN.   In Belgium, neither a RFE, a MSE, a +RFE, or a –
RFE occur.  However, it is hard to say if this would be the case if the countries were 
composed of one single cultural group, or one single political system.   
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Chapter 5:   Countries where Anti-Immigrant Parties Have Little Effect: Sweden, 
Norway, and Finland  
The anti-immigration parties that have existed here have gained little or no 
foothold at the parliamentary level.  As a result, I have a bit less to report on them, but I 
can still explore what causes the absence of shift and flank effects in these three 
countries. 
The Nordic countries of Norway, Finland and Sweden have a history distinct from 
that shared by many other Western European democracies.  In turn, political 
developments in this region have also followed a uniquely Nordic path.  There are several 
regional phenomena that can aid in explaining why anti-immigration parties have not 
gained significant political strength in the Scandinavian countries of Norway, Finland, 
and Sweden.  First of all, “the politics of the Scandinavian countryside expressed a 
distinctly democratic and antielitist thrust that enabled these political forces to enter an 
alliance with working-class parties” (Kitschelt 1997:123).  While feudalism made up the 
political system in most European countries, many in Scandinavia remained sovereign 
smallholders.  Thus, during the formation of the modern political parties in the 20th 
century, the interests of rural farmers were not inherently tied to upper class interests, 
allowing for political alliances to form among those with similar interests, specifically 
smallholders and working-class parties.  Another issue that is significant in the 
examination of the failure of anti-immigration parties in this region is the virtual absence 
of small industrial producers.   According to Kitschelt, small business owners have 
“fueled extreme-rightists and populist movement in some European countries after World 
War II, such as Poujadism in France and the MSI in Italy” (1997: 124).  The urban 
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support base of many anti-immigration parties is the population of small business 
owners—or petite bourgeoisie.  In their relative absence, there is significantly less 
demand for this type of political representation.  Next—with the exception of Norway, 
where, “a dramatic decline in political confidence in the early 1970s” occurred in 
response to the increasingly high tax burden—the highly regulated market and collective 
bargaining that was sustained in these countries throughout the economic crisis of the 
1970s and 1980s delayed significant economic impacts on the populations (Betz 1994: 
43).  While the trend throughout Europe at this time was the adoption of more liberal 
economic policies that embrace free market ideologies, Sweden and Finland still 
embraced comprehensive welfare states.  In both cases, the burden of this welfare state on 
voters was not overt as it was in other countries, like Denmark and Norway.  Thus, the 
prospect of tax-protest voting was less likely.  Finally, the absence of a fascist legacy in 
Scandinavia also played a minor role in the absence of a significant anti-immigration 
party parliamentary presence.  Overall, these distinct issues have strongly impacted the 
development—or lack of development—of successful anti-immigration parties in 
Norway, Sweden, and Denmark: first, the presence of antielitist agrarian freeholders, 
also, the relative absence of small industrial producers, the highly regulated market and 
collective bargaining in Sweden and Finland have staved off the economic conditions that 
would lead to a significant support base for a tax protest party and lastly, the fact that 
there is no history of an entrenched far-right party in these three countries has rendered 
contemporary far right parties unable to conjure up nostalgia or build on an existing 
support base.   
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First of all, “[i]n Norway and Sweden, and to a lesser extent in Denmark, 
independent freeholders had persisted throughout the period of feudalism elsewhere in 
Europe.  In the nineteenth century they began to develop their own political 
representation…” (Kitschelt 1997:123).    In other words, one of the particular segments 
of society most often targeted by and frequently the primary support base of anti-
immigration parties—smallholders, or owners of small farming operations, and other 
small business operators in rural areas and small towns—after World War II already had 
an established a political infrastructure all their own.  In fact, they had worked in concert 
with working-class parties, thus further dismissing any potential appeal of an extreme 
right party.  According to Kitschelt, it is the case in many countries that “…a politically 
and economically subordinated peasantry could be co-opted into the conservative, anti-
democratic coalition organized by rural and urban elites in countries where later on 
fascist movements thrived” (1997:123).  This mechanism could not work where there 
was not already politically and economically subordinated peasantry, as is the case in 
Norway, Sweden, and Finland.  It was the case that, “[i]n Scandinavia, in contrast, rural 
smallholders stayed away from the extreme Right and could be co-opted into an 
alternative coalition that also included the labor movement and elements of the industrial 
bourgeoisie” (Kitschelt 1997: 123).  
The next relevant issue is the small number of petite bourgeoisie.  Kitschelt states 
that, “ [i]f there is any sociostructural factor that made fascism less likely here than in 
Germany or Italy, it is the relative insignificance of small industrial producers” (Kitschelt 
1997:124).  Small business owners have been a significant source of support for extreme-
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right movements Western Europe.  In the absence or even scarcity of small business 
owners, anti-immigration parties would be lacking an essential support base.   
“In Scandinavia, the quantitative weight of these groups had been reduced by process of 
industrialization that favored very large corporations” (Kitschelt 1997:124).  Thus, 
because of the development of industry in these countries, an essential constituency to 
anti-immigration parties is ostensibly absent. 
 Thirdly, it is essential to look at how economic pressures that led voters in other 
countries to be attracted by far-right anti-immigration parties were absent—or at least less 
significant—in both Finland and Sweden.  According to Betz, “[t]he growing distrust in 
the political establishment in Denmark and Norway in the 1970s was largely a result of 
growing public opposition to rising taxes and growing ambiguity toward the further 
expansion of the welfare state”  (1994:42).  For two distinct reasons, voters in Finland 
and Sweden did not feel that the tax burden of the welfare state was significant enough to 
lodge a vote in dissent.  
In Finland, it is the lack of government intervention into the relationship between 
employers and employees that has negated a significant need amongst voters to protest 
welfare state policy.  According to Huber and Stephens, “[d]espite the fact that the 
Finnish production regime, along with the Norwegian, is the most statist in Scandinavia, 
the welfare state regime is the least statist” (2001:139).  In other words, in Finland, the 
government was not the entity supporting benefits for workers, but the entity facilitating 
it.  Tripartite corporatism dominates in Finland, leaving the impetus for improvements 
upon and the sustainability of the welfare state on industry and organized labor, by using 
government mandates instead of government administration (Huber and Stephens: 2001).  
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 In Sweden, on the other hand, it is the high level of entrenchment of the welfare 
state that led to less disapproval amongst voters.  According to Kitschelt:   
“[w]hereas the potential for tax revolt was nigh in Denmark and Norway, it 
remained relatively low in Sweden, although Sweden had an overall tax burden 
equivalent to or greater than that of its Scandinavian neighbors.  But unlike its 
neighbors, Sweden relied on a mix of income, sales, and payroll taxes that 
decreased the visibility of taxation levels and growth rates” (1997:129).  
 
In the case of Sweden, it was the invisibility of tax mechanisms that allowed for continual 
growth of the welfare state without significant resistance.   
Finally, while less significant than the previously mentioned issues, it is notable 
that there is no significant history of support for fascist or other far-right political parties 
in these three countries.  Kitschelt states, “…the absence of a right-wing tradition in 
Scandinavian politics made it more difficult than in France to find a policy appeal that 
would rally voters around a new program” (1997:128-129).  Having to build the appeal of 
the party from the ground up was an asset, as it allowed the party a great degree of 
dexterity in establishing its platform.  However, it was also a liability, as it meant that the 
party had to build its support base from scratch.  There was no fascist legacy to rely on 
for support, nor any preexisting networks of far-right organizations to fall back upon. 
Norway 
The Progress Party in Norway is different than the anti-immigration parties in 
Sweden and Finland in many regards.  It achieved considerable success employing an 
anti-immigration platform, as compared to the to the True Finns party in Finland, and the 
New Democracy party in Sweden.  However, it seems that it was not the anti-
immigration thrust alone that facilitated the success of the Progress Party, but the anti-
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immigration position as one position of many embraced by the agile and opportunistic 
party.   
The Progress Party (Bokmål: Fremskrittspartiet, Nynorsk: Framstegspartiet 
[FRP]) was formed in, “April 1973 as Anders Lange's Party for a Strong Reduction in 
Taxation and Public Intervention” (“Norway” 2005).  It was initially formed by Lange as 
an anti-tax protest party.  Though Lange died in 1974, the party continued.  Touted by 
some as a populist party, the main themes the FRP emphasized by the 1977 Storting 
elections—elections to Norway’s parliament—were “law-and-order policies, attacks on 
the welfare state, and demands for immigrations restrictions” (Hossay 2002:338).  In 
1978 Carl Hagan took over as the party’s charismatic leader, and remained such until 
2006, when he stepped down.  The performance of the FRP depended on its agility to 
move from issue to issue.  From tax protest in the early 1970s the party moved on to fully 
embraced immigration restriction as its main platform.  When the government tightened 
restrictions in 1988, the party then became primarily a “law and order” party (Kitschelt 
2004:134.)  Though this agility from issue to issue was an asset, it came at the expense of 
a far-right legacy.  As mentioned above, there was no previous significant far-right party 
to which the FRP could be linked.  On one hand, this provided the party with a blank 
slate to fill with the issues the party viewed as pertinent.  On the other hand, this left the 
party with no significant network of far-right followers to call upon for support. (See 
Appendix A, Table 11 for right-wing party seat holdings for 1980-2005.) 
The two mainstream conservative parties in Norway are the Christian People’s 
Party (Kristelig Folkeparti [KrF]) and the Conservative Party (Høyre [H]).  The KrF was 
founded as a Christian democratic party in 1933, as an alternative to secularism and 
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socialism (“Norway” 2005).  It was established on a socially conservative platform, and 
has maintained this program throughout the decades.  While there is some support from 
non-Christians, the majority of the KrF’s constituency is composed of socially-
conservative voters of the Christian faith.  The H, on the other hand, while also an 
alternative to socialism, is a socially-progressive center-right party that embraces free-
market capitalism and other liberal fiscal policies.  It was formed in 1884, and is one of 
the oldest parties in Norway.    
Finland 
In Finland the government has not pursued a very strong integration policy with 
respect to migrants.  They have also taken few asylum seekers.  As a result, it is rather 
surprising that a radical anti-immigrant party has even taken root.  However, the 
argument could be made that since “Finland maintains one of Europe’s strictest 
immigration policies”, there has not been a significant need for a party to emerge to 
address the issue (Mead 1991:313).   
The True Finns (Perussuomalaiset [PS]) is an anti-immigration political party in 
Finland.  It is the successor of the Finnish Rural Party (Suomen Maaseudun Puolue 
[SMP]), a party that began as a protest movement for small farmers.  After winning one 
seat in the 1995 parliamentary elections, the SMP dissolved due to internal strife.  The PS 
emerged as the successor, and ran in the parliamentary elections of 1999. (See Appendix 
A, Table 13 for right-wing party seat holdings for 1980-2005.) 
The SMP was an anti-establishment party, which embraced “a ‘Poujadist’ line” 
when it was founded in the 1950s as a splinter faction of the Finnish Smallholders' Party, 
a party that later developed into the Centre Party of Finland (“Finland” 2005).  The SMP 
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“entered government for the first time as part of a coalition headed by the Finnish Social 
Democratic Party” in 1983, but had yet to regain the share of votes received in that 
parliamentary election when it dissolved (“Finland” 2005). Though some have claimed 
that this party had nationalistic tendencies—in part because of the theme of the “forgotten 
nation”, which emphasized the rights of small farmers and small businessmen—the SMP 
did not take a specifically anti-immigration platform (Arter 1999: 103).  However, the 
PS, on the other hand, “presented Finnish voters with an anti-immigrant far right 
alternative” (Cochrane and Nevitte 2007: 5). 
The Finnish Christian Democrats (Suomen Kristillisdemokraatit [KD], formerly 
the Finnish Christian Union or Suomen Kristillinen Liitto [SKL]) and the National 
Coalition (Kansallinen Kokoomus [KOK]) are the mainstream conservative parties in 
Finland.  The forerunner of the KD, the SKL, was “an evangelical party founded in 1958 
to propagate Christian values in public life and to resist secularization” (“Finland” 2005).   
The KOK was founded in 1919 as a moderate conservative party.  This party has been far 
more successful than the KOK, often as one of the three leading parties in Finland. 
Sweden 
The New Democracy (Ny Demokrati [NyD]) was a short-lived populist, anti-
immigration party in Sweden.  This party won 24 seats in the Swedish legislative body, 
the Riksdag, in 1991, but failed to attain any seats in the 1994 elections (“Sweden” 2005).  
The platform the NyD claimed to embrace was similar to that of other new radical right 
parties that rejected xenophobia, and cited purely economic motivation in its support of 
immigration restriction.  However, those in opposition of NyD often claimed that the 
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rhetoric of the party invoked xenophobia. (See Appendix A, Table 15 for right-wing 
party seat holdings for 1980-2005.) 
There are four significant mainstream conservative parties in Sweden, which are 
the Moderate Party (Moderata Samlingspartiet [MSP]), the Centre Party (Centerpartiet 
[CP]), the Liberal People's Party (Folkpartiet Liberalerna [FPL]), and the Christian 
Democrats (Kristdemokraterna [Kd]). All four of these “moderate right” parties embrace 
some ideologies that are not typically associated with right wing political parties.  In 
international context, it is quite possible that they would be categorized on the left side of 
the political spectrum.  However, within the context of Swedish politics, as the alternative 
to the Social Democrats, they are seen as center-right or right wing. The MSP was 
founded in 1904, and “combines a conservative heritage with liberal market ideas to 
advocate a moderate, anti-socialist policy in favour of a free-market economy and 
individual freedom of choice” (“Sweden” 2005).  Both the CP and the FPL embrace 
social liberalism.  The CP was founded in 1910 as a party representing agricultural 
interests.  The FPL was formed in 1934, but has roots in the 1800s.  The Kd was founded 
in 1964, as “the third alternative in Sweden, where all [other] parties are socialistic or 
non-socialistic” (“Sweden” 2005).  According to Hossay these four parties composed a 
minority government after the 1991 parliamentary elections, for which the NyD “initially 
provided support” (2002: 341).  Until 1994, the NyD “gave often vital external voting 
support to the centre-right minority government” (“Sweden” 2005).  However, it was in 
1994 that the leader of the NyD resigned, and the support provided by the NyD ceased.   
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Conclusion 
Overall, several specific historical developments particular to these Nordic 
countries can be used to explain the lack of success experienced by anti-immigration 
parties within them.  First of all, “…the continuity of democratic competition and 
particularly the unique political organization of the countryside prevented the rise of a 
strong fascist movement in Scandinavia…” (Kitschelt 1997:124).  Secondly, the 
insignificant size of the petite bourgeoisie in Norway, Sweden, and Finland did not lend 
these countries to the development of anti-immigration parties.  In that small business 
owners are often the urban constituent bases of extreme-right parties, there would little or 
no demand for this type of political representation.  Next, there were definite conditions 
in Finland and Sweden that were inhospitable to a tax revolt—the type of party that, in 
several other European countries, often later co-opted an anti-immigrant message if it did 
not embrace one from its outset.  Thus, there was not a high demand for a tax protest 
party. Lastly, there was no far-right legacy in Scandinavia for anti-immigration parties to 
rely on for immediate support.  Now I will go on to discuss the political parties of each 
country individually. 
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Chapter 6: Overall Flanks, Shifts and Effects:  Boolean Analysis of all the Countries 
The previous three chapters have examined case studies of eight countries.  In this 
analysis chapter, I put all of these countries together to examine five hypotheses and 
generate some new results.  I use Boolean analysis to examine the effects of 
unemployment rates, immigration rates and asylum rates on the four outcomes that are of 
my concern in this thesis:  the positive radical flank effect (+RFE), the radical shift effect 
(RSE), the negative radical flank effect (-RFE), and the moderate shift effect (MSE).  I 
also explore other social, historical, and political variables that emerged during the 
country case studies, and their possible effects on the four mechanisms listed above.  In 
the following, I will proceed in four steps:  (1) delineate the independent variables 
proposed in the introduction and the additional variables that I use in the analysis, (2) use 
Boolean methods to explain the causes of the positive cases, (3) explain how the negative 
cases (countries with anti-immigrant parties that display neither flank or shift effects) are 
causally different from the positive cases, and finally (4) conclude about the Boolean 
findings.   
The Explanatory Factors     
First, I will briefly explain each of the variables used in the Boolean analysis.  
Each variable in the Boolean table plays an explanatory role in the final analysis of 
radical flank and shift effects.  I have included two Boolean tables—Table 1 and Table 
2—in the interest of illustrating the analytical process in this work.  The Table 1 includes 
all of the variables considered, while Table 2 includes only those pertinent to the final 
analysis.  Since the methodology employed in this work includes the use of “method of 
difference”, some will be eliminated from Table 2.  (For instance, the variable, 
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“successful adoption of the populist component of the FN master frame” will be 
eliminated, because there is a “1” for every country in the study.  Thus, this variable has 
no explanatory value.)   
The variables have been separated into two broad categories, independent 
variables and dependent variables.  Originally, there had been only four dependent 
variables, or outcomes.  The variables were the presence of positive radical flank effect, 
the presence of negative radical flank effect, the presence of radical shift effect and the 
presence of moderate shift effect.  However, as is often found, the reality reflected in this 
analysis does not fit neatly into the categories that were originally theorized.  In the case 
of France, both a +RFE and a MSE occurred.  As this outcome is not merely a sum if its 
parts, a new dependent variable has been created: an interactive effect between positive 
radical flank effect and moderate shift effect.   
Next, the independent variables were put into three subcategories: 
economic/demographic variables, political variables, and historical legacies variable(s).  
The original three primary variables of the study—unemployment rate, immigration rate 
and asylum rate—are all included in the economic/demographic variables subcategory. 
The subcategory of political variables includes: presence/absence of anti-immigration 
party, presence/absence of charismatic leader at the helm of anti-immigration party, anti-
immigration party is/is not part of large block, successful/unsuccessful adoption of the 
populist component of the FN master frame, successful/unsuccessful adoption of the 
ethnopluralist component of the FN master frame, deliberate use of/avoidance of racist 
rhetoric in the public sphere, and support of anti-immigration party as protest vote/not a 
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protest vote.  Finally, the third category contains only one variable.  This category—
historical legacies—explores whether or not the country has a legacy of fascism.   
I originally theorized that the three variables in the economic/demographic 
subcategory would be the primary independent variables of the study. It seems, though, 
that they are less significant than originally conceived.  However, while the presence of 
high immigration rates and high asylum rates alone do not seem to have striking effect, it 
seems that the presence of a high unemployment rate tends to activate both immigration 
variables.  What this means is that when unemployment rates are low, citizens tend not to 
be threatened by high levels of immigration and high levels of asylum.  However, when 
unemployment rates rise, people begin to panic and look for someone or something to 
blame.  The scapegoats in this case are often immigrants and asylum seekers.  Thus, the 
presence of high unemployment rates galvanizes a negative attitude towards high 
immigration and asylum rates.  In the Table 1 below, I include all three variables 
separately. Because all of the countries in the study experienced both high rates of 
immigration and high rates of asylum from 2000-2005, I omit those from Table 2 as 
separate variables.  In Table 2 I include unemployment rate in combination with 
immigration rate and asylum rate.  I do this because a high rate of unemployment will 
trigger a reaction to high immigration and asylum rates.   
Most of the political variables in this study emerged organically from the case 
studies of the countries.  The first variable—presence of anti-immigration party—
however, was not one of these.  To be included in this study, an anti-immigration party 
had to have a significant presence in parliamentary elections.  Thus, all of the cases have 
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been assigned a “1” for the first variable, “presence of anti-immigration party”. This is 
included in Table 1, but not Table 2.   
The rest of the political variables did become apparent in the process of 
conducting the case studies.  For instance, in this study, it became evident that, in some 
cases, a cult of personality can develop around the charismatic leader of a political party.  
This leader can often have a considerable effect on the path of the party.  Whether or not 
an anti-immigration party has a charismatic leader is one of the variables in this Boolean 
analysis.   
The next variable addresses the formation of alliances among parties.  While 
coalitions are quite common, this variable denotes the presence of a specific type of 
coalition, one that forms before the election.  For the purposes of this study, a “block” 
will refer to a group of collated parties that run in parliamentary elections as one entity.  
In this analysis, one of the variables assesses whether or not the anti-immigration party 
becomes part of a block.   
The subsequent variables are deeply interrelated, but had to be divided to be 
accurately considered.  As stated above, it is theorized that the French National Front was 
the primary actor in reinvigorating anti-immigrant political parties, since the 
stigmatization of political positions that embrace exclusivity and xenophobia that 
occurred after the Second World War.  Some theorists (see Spektorowski 2003; Rydgren 
2004) have postulated that, in reinvigorating this position as a viable political platform, 
the FN also innovated by creating an effective master frame that other anti-immigrant 
parties could learn from.  However, while Rydgren (2004) attributes this innovation, in 
part, to a combination of populist appeal and the employment of ethnopluralist doctrine, I 
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believe evidence suggests otherwise.  For the sake of this study I will be separating these 
two components. While the FN may have tried to embrace both populism and 
ethnopluralism, it seems that they did not successfully exude both.  The successful 
invocation of ethnopluralism depends on maintaining a façade of equality.  
Ethnopluralism is a doctrine that allows a political candidate to take a “pragmatic” 
approach to excluding immigrants.  It rests on the premise that all cultures are equal, but 
better preserved by separation.  Thus, to benefit from taking an ethnopluralist stance—
one that allows for a staunch anti-immigrant position without the stigma associated with 
racism—one cannot simultaneously maintain a xenophobic or racist public image.  
Therefore, I argue that the populist portion of this master frame and the ethnopluralist 
portion of the master frame are not inextricably linked.  In this analysis, one variable will 
indicate whether or not a party was successful at employing the populist portion of the 
FN master frame.  The second variable will indicate whether or not a party successfully 
employed the ethnopluralist portion of the master frame.  As it is the case that all of the 
anti-immigration parties in this study have embraced the populist component of the FN 
master frame, the outcome of the fourth variable will be the same for all eight countries.  
Hence, this variable will not be included in Table 2. 
The sixth variable is in opposition to the fifth.  It signifies whether or not a party 
outwardly engaged in calculated and purposeful use of racism and/or xenophobia.  This 
variable has a dichotomous relationship with the variable regarding the successful 
employment of the ethnopluralist portion of the FN master frame, as one cannot employ 
ethnopluralism while overtly employing racism, and one cannot maintain a racist public 
image while simultaneously purporting to hold a belief of ethnopluralism.   
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The next political variable denotes the political ideology of the anti-immigration 
party.  If it is the case that the party has campaigned on platforms including positions 
other than or in addition to an anti-immigration position, this party will be considered—
for the sake of this study—to embrace a “diverse platform”.  If, however, the party has 
promoted itself as a single-issue party, exclusively concerned with making immigration 
policy more restrictive, the party will be considered as not having a diverse platform.  
This variable will be included in Table 1. Because all of the countries in the study had 
diverse platforms during the 2000-2005 timeframe—making all of the outcomes the 
same—this variable will not be included in Table 2. 
Only one country in this study is an ethnically and linguistically divided country, 
and that is Belgium.  This is the case right down to the geography and government of the 
country.  The northwest is Flemish speaking, and the southeast is French speaking.  Each 
section has its own political parties, including different anti-immigrant parties.  No other 
country in this study is similarly divided so it is only scored one for Belgium.  Later 
analysis will explain how this variable works.   
The final political variable indicates whether or not the votes lodged for an anti-
immigration party are protest votes.  However, “the idea of the protest vote fails to 
register the real political issue at stake” (Neocleous and Startin 2003:146). Neocleous and 
Startin state, “that to describe the vote for Le Pen and, concomitantly, votes for other far 
right parties as a ‘protest vote’ is seriously to misjudge the nature of the political 
phenomenon in question” (2003:153).  To suggest that voters did not vote for the anti-
immigration parties, but were instead voting against the conventional parties is to suggest  
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that the platform of the anti-immigration party was irrelevant to that choice.  Clearly, if 
voters were dissatisfied with the moderate right parties, it would follow that they would 
choose another option.  With several options available—for instance, voting for a party 
on the left or abstaining from voting (in all cases except Belgium)—the fact that these 
voters actively chose to use their ballot to support the anti-immigration votes implies that 
something about the political platform about these parties resonated with their political 
leanings.  Thus, to categorize a vote as a protest vote or “a vote which thus lacks any 
‘core identity’ ” is to undermine the intent of the voter (Neocleous and Startin 2003: 145).  
In the case of this study, none of the anti-immigration parties will be characterized as 
supported by protest votes.  Consequently, this variable will not be included in Table 2, 
as it is consistent among all eight parties, rendering it ineffective as an explanatory 
mechanism. 
The Analysis of Countries having a Flank or Shift Effect      
 The following Boolean analysis will be done first of Denmark, followed by 
Austria, Italy and France.  Each analysis will present a full model with all the variables, 
and then a reduced model with only those variables that work in the final explanation.  
Each variable is referred to as a two or three letter combination term (for instance, EMF 
indicates an ethnopluralist component in the master frame of the anti-immigrant party as 
indicates in the Front National).  When this term is capitalized, it means that an effect is 
present, but when it is in small letters, it means that the effect is not present.  The result 
will be displayed as an equation such as the one coming immediately in the text 
(+RSE=ue+cl+blk+EMF+rr+hf).  This can be interpreted as a radical shift effect being 
caused by the presence of EMF but the absence of ue, cl, blk, rr, and hf.  This is the 
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standard technique used by the originator of the Boolean approach though he sometimes 
uses single letters for variables.  I am using a combination of letters since they invoke the 
meaning of the variable a little bit better.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1:  The Full Boolean Analysis of Radical Flank, Radical Shift and 
Moderate Shift Effects: 2000-2005 
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Economic/demographic variables 
Unemployment rates (UE) 
Immigration rates (IMG) 
Asylum rates (ASY) 
Political variables 
Presence of anti-immigration party (AIP) 
Anti-immigration party has charismatic leader  (CL) 
Political parties form blocks (BLK)  
Populist component of FN master frame (PMF) 
Ethnopluralist component of FN master frame (EMF) 
Blatantly racist rhetoric (RR) 
Diverse Platform (DP) 
Support for anti-immigrant party is a protest vote (PV)   
Ethnically divided society and state (EDSS) 
Historical Legacies: 
History of fascism (HF) 
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Positive radical flank effect is present (+RFE) 
Negative radical flank effect is present (-RFE) 
Radical shift effect is present (RSE) 
Moderate shift effect is present (MSE) 
0 
0  
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
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0 
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0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
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0 
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0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
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0 
Variables: 
Economic/demographic variables 
UE 1 for an unemployment rate over cutting point established for country, 0 for at or under 
IMG 1 for an immigration rate over cutting point established for country, 0 for at or under. 
ASY 1 for inflow of asylum-seeker rate over cutting point established for country, 0 for at or under  
*cutting points available in Appendix B 
Political variables 
AIP  1 for presence of  anti-immigration party, 0 for absence 
CL 1 for anti-immigration party has charismatic leader, 0 for moderate public leadership abilities 
BLK 1 for radical parties part of large block, 0 for radical parties on their own 
PMF 1 for successful adoption of the populist component of the FN master frame, 0 for unsuccessful 
adoption 
EMF 1 for successful adoption of the ethnopluralist component of the FN master frame, 0 for unsuccessful 
adoption 
RR 1 for invocation of racist rhetoric in the public sphere, 0 for no racist rhetoric in the public sphere 
DP 1 for diverse platform, 0 for single-issue (anti-immigrationism) platform 
PV 1 for support of anti-immigration party as protest vote, 0 for anti-immigration party support not protest 
vote 
EDSS 1 for ethnically divided society and state, 0 for states and societies without such divisions 
Historical legacies: 
HF 1 for history of fascism in country, 0 for no significant history of fascism in country 
Dependent variables: 
+RFE 1 for positive radical flank effect 0 for no positive radical flank effect at any time during period 
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-RFE 1 for negative radical flank effect 0 for no negative radical flank effect at any time during period 
RSE 1 for radical shift effect 0 for no radical shift effect at any time during period 
MSE 1 for moderate shift effect 0 for no moderate shift effect at any time during period 
Table 2:  The Reduced Boolean Analysis of Radical Flank, Radical Shift and 
Moderate Shift Effects: 2000-2005 
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Anti-immigration party has charismatic leader  (CL) 
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Variables: 
Economic/demographic variables 
UE (IMG+ASY) 1 for presence of high immigration and asylum levels, during a time of high 
unemployment 
 
Political variables 
CL 1 for anti-immigration party has charismatic leader, 0 for moderate public leadership abilities 
BLK 1 for radical parties part of large block, 0 for radical parties on their own 
EMF 1 for successful adoption of the ethnopluralist component of the FN master frame, 0 for unsuccessful 
adoption 
RR 1 for invocation of racist rhetoric in the public sphere, 0 for no racist rhetoric in the public sphere 
EDSS 1 for ethnically divided society and state, 0 for no such divisions 
Dependent variables: 
+RFE 1 for positive radical flank effect 0 for no positive radical flank effect at any time during period 
-RFE 1 for negative radical flank effect 0 for no negative radical flank effect at any time during period 
RSE 1 for radical shift effect 0 for no radical shift effect at any time during period 
MSE 1 for moderate shift effect 0 for no moderate shift effect at any time during period 
+RFE*RSE 1 for interactive effect between positive radical flank effect and radical shift effect 0 for no 
interactive effect during any time during the period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  98
  99
                                                       
Denmark 
The results show that in Denmark, there is a radical shift effect, which supports 
hypothesis two.  In this case, the moderate conservative party shifted to embrace 
ideologies similar to those of the radical party, especially its anti-immigrant position.  
    RSE= ue + IMG + ASY + AIP + cl + blk + PMF + EMF + rr + DP + pv + edss + hf 
    RSE= ue + cl  + blk  + EMF + rr + hf + edss 
As the equation above illustrates, low unemployment (which, in turn, did not activate the 
presence of high immigration and asylum rates) combined with the absence of a 
charismatic leader, the absence of block coalitions, the presence of successfully 
employed ethnopluralism7 and the absence of a legacy of fascism are conducive to a 
RSE.  Below, I will discuss four of these variables as the most influential in the rise of the 
DFp, and the racial shift effect that followed. 
 High unemployment often signifies some sort of economic instability or crisis.  
When people are not able to find jobs to provide for themselves and their families, panic 
often ensues.  When unemployment levels are low, on the other hand, a society 
experiences a degree of security that is not present during times of high unemployment.  
Because of this sense of security, many Danish voters were able to take a risk by 
supporting an alternative political party.  The position of economic stability that Denmark 
experienced in the first years of the 21st century allowed voters to take a chance on a non-
traditional party.  This, combined with the DFp’s successful invocation ethnopluralism 
empowered this periphery party to achieve considerable success in Denmark.   
 
7 As was stated previously, since the successful employment of the ethnopluralist aspect of the FN master 
frame negates the embrace of overt racism, it is not necessary to further clarify that racist rhetoric was not 
employed.  
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By employing ethnopluralism successfully, the DFp was able to capitalize on anti-
immigration sentiment in society without appealing to racism.  By avoiding such a 
stigmatized position, they gave voters that would have avoided association with and 
support of an overtly racist party a medium through which to lodge their discontent with 
immigration policy.  In essence, they provided an alternative to the conventional right, 
which did not adequately address the needs of voters, without invoking racist rhetoric, 
which is often perceived as undemocratic.   
Finally, the absence of a legacy of fascism in Denmark allowed the FrP to 
establish itself without being defined by the past.  Thus, by the time the DFp emerged, 
the only legacy it had to compete with was that of the FrP.  This gave the FrP, as well as 
the DFp a high degree of agility.  Instead of being intrinsically linked with fascism by 
being a far-right party, each party was able to set its own agenda and its own platform.  In 
fact, the DFp was able to benefit from observing the successes and failures of the FrP.  
Therefore, the actions of the only other far-right party in Denmark actually benefitted the 
DFp. 
Austria 
In Austria, a moderate shift effect can be observed.  This supports hypothesis 
four. Marginal success of the FPÖ led to its inclusion in the ruling coalition.  The FPÖ 
then began to moderate its anti-immigrant position to further become part of the 
mainstream political system.  In fact, in 2000, Haider formally stepped down in an effort 
to distance himself from the FPÖ (though, for all practical purposes he was still the 
leader) as a gesture to lend the party more legitimacy.  As Haider was the character 
primarily associated with the racism and xenophobia, as he was the most public figure of 
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the party, his abdication of the leadership symbolized the party’s departure from outward 
bigotry.   
    MSE= UE + IMG + ASY + AIP + CL + blk + PMF + emf + rr + DP + pv + edss + HF 
    MSE= UE (IMG +ASY) + CL + blk + emf + rr + edss + HF 
As illustrated by the equation above, it appears that the combination of high 
unemployment (which, in turn, triggers a reaction to the presence of high immigration 
and asylum rates), the presence of a charismatic leader and a legacy of fascism, along 
with the absence of block coalitions, racist rhetoric and ethnopluralism are favorable for 
the development of a moderate shift effect. 
In Denmark, the stability created by low unemployment allowed voters to take a 
risk on a new, non-traditional party, the DFp.  In the case of Austria, the high 
unemployment rate diminished the likelihood of risk taking in the voting booth.  During 
times of high unemployment—which is often an indicator of economic downturn or 
crisis—people seek security and safety.  Voting for a rogue political party on the fringes 
of legitimacy is not a vote for security.  However, it seems that the FPÖ recognized this, 
and began to moderate its image in response to increasing popularity.  The legislative 
election in 1999 was its most popular year, and was also the year Haider—the outspoken, 
Nazi-sympathizing leader of the FPÖ—stepped down.  The irony is that, as stated in the 
Austrian case study, Givens found, “it would appear that some combination of 
unemployment and foreigners is positively related to the vote for the FPÖ in Austria” 
(1999:151).  It is not a surprise, then, that after the 2000 elections, support for the FPÖ 
began to decline.  The focus of this analysis, though, is to ascertain what circumstances 
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led to the moderate shift effect.  Specifically, I will focus on five of the variables from the 
equation above.   
First, as mentioned above, is the presence of high unemployment.  Though high 
immigration and asylum rates were found in all eight countries included in this study, 
Austria is the only country of the four in which flank, shift or interaction effects occur 
that had a combination of high unemployment, immigration, and asylum rates.  It is this 
combination that creates its own interaction effect.  Alone, high immigration and asylum 
rates often go unnoticed.  However, in the presence of high unemployment rates, the 
presence of immigrants—as non-asylum seekers in the workforce, or as asylum seekers 
receiving government assistance—is highly scrutinized, along with immigration policy.  
Thus the influence here is twofold.  First, high unemployment rates cause increased 
concern with immigrants.  Second, the feeling of instability that results from economic 
insecurity compels people to seek comfort.  By moderating its public image, but 
maintaining an anti-immigration stance, the FPÖ was able to appeal to both of these 
outcomes.   
Another important variable in the case of the FPÖ is the presence of a charismatic 
leader.  While Haider officially stepped down as the leader of the FPÖ in 2000, he 
maintained an informal leadership role until 2005.  This put the FPÖ in an advantageous 
position.  It allowed it to adopt a façade of conformity, which—it was believed—would 
allow for a sustained presence in the political sphere in Austria.  On the other hand, 
Haider’s continued “unofficial” leadership role reassured long-term supporters that the 
FPÖ had not strayed too far from its original ideologies.  As stated in the Austria case 
study, Haider played a paternal role as leader, often embodying the role of “protector” of 
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Austria.  In this role, he employed rhetoric to imply that he was able to defend Austrians 
from the outsiders trying to take their jobs, as well as defend traditionally Austrian values 
from being overshadowed by those foreign values brought by non-European immigrants.  
In a time of high unemployment and a perceived threat from immigrants, this character 
was appealing to many. 
The next variables to be discussed illuminate the complexity of the FPÖ in the 
2000-2005 period.  First, as stated previously, Haider stepped down in 2000, after the 
FPÖ became the junior member of a right-wing coalition government in 1999, with the 
ÖVP.  This move was widely seen as an effort to appease those who had been angered by 
the moderate ÖVP’s willingness to ally itself with the FPÖ, which was perceived to be a 
radical—thus somewhat stigmatized—party.  While this was more of a symbolic gesture 
than a substantial transition in party ideology, it was necessary for the FPÖ to present a 
non-racist front.  Accordingly, I argue that the FPÖ neither embraced ethnopluralism, nor 
did they employ racist rhetoric.  It is difficult to separate the FPÖ and Haider.  However, 
there was separation and though it was only superficial, it was self-imposed and enforced 
to a large degree.  Thus, while Haider did not temper his public image, there were efforts 
made to distance that image from the image of the FPÖ.  This is a difficult variable to 
determine, as it is clear that the FPÖ benefited from its association with Haider and his 
racist rhetoric.  I argue, however, that since there were overt gestures to disassociate the 
party with these ideologies—whether only as a veneer or not—the FPÖ does not qualify 
as using blatantly racist rhetoric in the 2000-2005 time frame. 
Finally, the legacy of fascism in Austria also played a role in the rise of the FPÖ, 
and the subsequent moderate shift effect.  As mentioned in the case study, Austria has a 
  104
complicated relationship with its fascist past.  On one hand, there were many Austrians 
that were pleased to be part of the Anschluss Österreich, or the entity created with 
Germany annexed Austria during the Third Reich, because of a pervasive sense of 
German identity among Austrians.  After World War II, Austria—along with most of the 
rest of Europe—took on the identity of victims of the Nazi.  There even exists a term for 
this in German, opfernation, or “victim nation”. Additionally, many of those that were 
alive—and old enough to make political decision—during this time are no longer alive.  
Thus, in a sense, a lot of contemporary Austrians feel as though they are being persecuted 
for “the sins of the father”.  So, during the Third Reich, there were many Nazi-
sympathizers in Austria; but after the war, the entire country embraced an identity of 
victimhood.  This manifests itself in two ways.  First of all, it allows for a false separation 
of fascism from Austrian identity.  While not all Austrians supported the Third Reich—in 
fact, many resisted every step of the way—there were many that did.  Whether explicit or 
concealed, there are still some Nazi-sympathizers in Austria, some from this previous era, 
some the children of those from the time of the Aschluss, and others that feel a degree of 
kinship with the German culture of that time.  Thus, there is a niche in society that the 
earlier embrace of racism, xenophobia and Nazi-sympathy of FPÖ appeals to.  Despite 
the fact that Haider stepped down in 2000, it was widely believe that he was still leading 
the party from behind the scenes.  For those with whom his rhetoric resonated, this was 
reason enough to continue to support the FPÖ.  Secondly, for those who embrace the 
identity of victim, Haider and the FPÖ played the guardian of Austria.  As stated in the 
case study of Austria, even though the FPÖ embraced an open economy, it was willing to 
initiate protectionist measures when Austria’s economy was perceived as “threatened”.  
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Overall, the FPÖ appealed to both sides of the post-World War II Austrian identity.  For 
those with far-right tendencies, Haider represented a sympathetic character.  For those 
that continued to feel victimized either by the Nazis, or accusations of Nazi-sympathy, 
the FPÖ and Haider were able to play the protector. 
Italy 
In Italy there is a +RFE.  In other words, there is support for hypothesis one.  In 
this case, the conservative or moderate parties experienced more success with their 
policies because the public and politicians were made more aware of immigration issues, 
but were simultaneously afraid of what they perceive as the “rogue” radical party. This 
occurred when immigration and asylum rates were increasing but unemployment rates 
were decreasing. The conservative party represents a stable and legitimate way to deal 
with the increase in immigration and asylum without risking any drastic departure from 
the conventional economic policies that are keeping unemployment down.  In fact, in the 
case of Italy, the radical party—the LN—entered into a block coalition with other 
moderate right-wing parties to form the House of Freedoms (CDL). In collating with 
Bossi and the LN, the moderate right wing parties benefit in two ways.  First, they are 
able to garner the favor of the extreme anti-immigration position that is spouted by the 
LN since they are in a coalition together; also, the moderate right wing are seen as 
keeping the LN and its radical notions “in check”.  Overall, both parties benefit. 
    +RFE= ue + ASY + IMG + AIP + cl + BLK + PMF + emf + RR + DP + pv + edss  
        + HF 
    +RFE= ue + cl + BLK + emf + RR + edss + HF 
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As the equation above illustrates, low unemployment (which, in turn, did not activate the 
presence of high immigration and asylum rates) combined with the absence of a 
charismatic leader, the presence of block coalitions, the absence of successfully 
employed ethnopluralism, the presence of racist rhetoric and the presence of a legacy of 
fascism are conducive to a positive radical flank effect.  Below, I will discuss several of 
these variables as the most influential in the existence of the LN, and the coalition it took 
part in with other right-wing parties, the CDL. 
 In the case of Denmark, the presence of a low unemployment rate compelled 
some voters to take a risk by giving their support to a new and somewhat unconventional 
political party.  This occurred because the DFp had a broad and consistent platform—that 
included not only an anti-immigration tenet, but also a strong emphasis on law and order, 
and a rejection of stronger European Union ties, among other issues—that resonated with 
many Danes.  The Northern League, on the other hand, has had a constantly changing 
platform.  It was formed in 1991 around ethnoregionalism.  The LN claimed that the 
“unproductive” southern region of Italy was a financial drain on the prospering North.  In 
turn, the LN has often called for the succession of the northern regions.  At times, the LN 
has painted itself and other Italians as victims of Northern European ethnocentrism along 
with people of developing nations.  At other times, the LN has railed against immigration 
from non-European nations, going as far as threatening violence towards those 
immigrants entering Italy illegally by crossing the Mediterranean.  As stated in the 
country case study, the LN had a tendency of “intensifying and moderating its 
xenophobic pronouncements in response to changing electoral moods” (Curran 2004:49).  
Though voting for the DFp was somewhat risky—as it was not a traditional party, and 
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was considered radical—a vote for the LN would be exceptionally perilous.  For that 
reason, the LN never gained more than a quarter of the seats as the leading moderate 
conservative coalition in the Chamber of Deputies, and gained only slightly over a 
quarter of the seats of the leading moderate conservative coalition in the Senate.  They 
were never a party that would be considered viable competition for the moderate 
conservative parties or coalitions, but they did gain a significant share of the electorate.   
 By usurping the LN into the CDL block, Berlusconi—the leader of Forward Italy 
(Forza Italia or FI) and the Pole of Freedoms coalition that became the House of 
Freedom coalition—was able to capitalize on the message of the LN, while 
simultaneously benefiting from “reigning in” the radical party.  Thus, block formations 
are an important variable in this case.  By forming the coalitions before the election, the 
other right-wing parties are able to reap the benefits at the polls of both the LN 
supporters—that will now lend their support to the block coalition—as well as some of 
the LN detractors—as a vote for the House of Freedoms is a vote for the moderate right, 
which many perceive as a more reasonable alternative to the LN for dealing with 
immigration issues.  Once elections are over, however, the larger parties within the House 
of Freedoms are able to temper the actions of the LN.  Thus, the moderate parties—
Berlusconi’s FI, in particular—benefit from the presence of the LN without having to 
accommodate any of the LN’s policy ambitions. 
 The next variable to be considered is the public use of racist language.  The leader 
of the LN, Umberto Bossi, is well known for his employment of fiery rhetoric.  Whether 
regarding the LN’s anti-immigration stance, or railing against the corruption of Southern 
Italy and Rome, Bossi is known for his use of strong language in discussing the LN’s 
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political positions.  This plays a significant role in the positive radical flank effect.  When 
Bossi engages in inflammatory language, he calls attention to himself and to the cause he 
is addressing—what type of attention, notwithstanding.  In turn, voters are made more 
aware of the anti-immigration issue.  The result is that, when Bossi calls attention to the 
issue, it gives the moderate right wing an opportunity to capitalize on the awareness of 
the issue by taking a strong stance on it.  The stance taken by the moderate right wing, 
however, is often perceived as more sensible than that proposed by Bossi.  Thus, the 
moderate right-wing parties benefit from addressing a significant issue in a way 
perceived by most voters as more practical and level-headed than the LN.   
 Finally, the legacy of fascism in Italy also has played a role in the success and 
failures of the LN, along with the positive radical flank effect.  The stigma associated 
with fascism in Italy has disabled several of the parties that have been bold enough to 
invoke racism in their platforms.  As mentioned above, Veugelers and Chiarini, “[s]igns 
of nativism bring one dangerously close to accusations of racism, and in Italy razzismo 
rhymes with fascismo, a stigmatizing label that cripples any position to which it can be 
attached” (2002:86).  This alone ensured the moderate right groups that the LN—and its 
often-vehement leader—posed no risk of competition.  However, given the amount of the 
support the LN gained since their founding, its message clearly resounded for some 
voters.  By bringing the LN into the CDL block coalition, the moderate right-wing parties 
were able to secure far-right votes, while maintaining moderate right votes, and 
potentially gaining support from other voters, as the more rational alternative to the LN.   
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 France 
France is a complex case.  Not only is there a positive radical flank effect, there is 
also a radical shift effect.  The radical shift effect seen in Denmark occurred because the 
DFp was beginning to become a threat to the moderate right party.  The positive radical 
flank effect in Italy occurred because the moderate right-wing parties represented a 
practical alternative to the LN, by addressing issues brought to light by the LN in a way 
seen as more reasonable.  In this case, similar phenomena have occurred.  The difference 
is that they occur simultaneously, thus creating a fifth effect—a dual effect of both a 
positive radical flank effect and a radical shift effect—not accounted for in the original 
design of this study.   
+RFE*RSE= ue + IMG + ASY + AIP + cl + blk + PMF + emf + RR + DP + pv  
              + edss + f 
    +RFE*RSE = ue + cl + blk + emf  + RR + edss + hf 
As demonstrated by the equation above, it appears that the absence of high 
unemployment (which, in turn, did not activate the presence of high immigration and 
asylum rates), the absence of a charismatic leader and a legacy of fascism, the absence of 
block coalitions, and the unsuccessful employment of ethnopluralism, along with the use 
of overtly racist rhetoric are favorable for the development of simultaneous positive 
radical flank and radical shift effects. 
 In Denmark, low unemployment compelled some voters to take a risk on the 
unproven DFp.  In Italy, low unemployment made a vote for the ever-vacillating LN 
quite precarious.  In France, low unemployment had a combination of effects.  For some 
voters, the FN offered enough stability and appeal that they chose to take the risk and 
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lend their support to the party. For others, Le Pen and his radical beliefs—and their 
inevitable association with the FN—represented something that does not have a place in a 
democratic society.   
 Jean-Marie Le Pen is one of the most well-known—if not also one of the most 
notorious—figures in French politics.  His party, the National Front (or FN), emerged in 
the 1980s as the first post-World War II party to openly and successfully embrace far-
right ideologies.  While not as successful as some far-right parties to come on the scene 
later—the DFp or FPÖ, for instance—the support the FN garnered was, at the time, a 
remarkable feat.  In fact, some theorists (see Kitschelt 1998) believe that the FN created a 
master frame that was later copied and honed by many other far-right parties, including 
all of the other far-right parties included in this study.  I argue, however, that the key 
word in that proposition is “honed”.  While the FN may have unintentionally created the 
master frame copied and improved upon by later parties, the FN itself did execute all 
components of the master frame in a successful way. While the FN was able to capitalize 
on a populist sentiment among voters, Le Pen has maintained his overtly racist, 
xenophobic, heterosexist, and anti-Semitic image since the beginning of the FN in 1972.  
Because of this, it cannot be that the FN also successfully invoked ethnopluralism, as the 
crux of ethnopluralism is the rejection of biological and reductionist racism in favor of 
the view that all cultures are unique and valid, but best kept separate to maintain 
distinction.  Thus, while the FN may have innovated by bringing ethnopluralism out of 
obscurity, it certainly did not employ it successfully. 
 The use of ethnocentrism as a valuable instrument for the FN was negated by the 
bigoted rhetoric engaged by Le Pen and others on frequent occasions.  It is this, I argue, 
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that created the conditions favorable for the interaction effect between the +RFE and a 
RSE.  Clearly, one can see that the anti-immigration message resonated with some—if 
not many—voters.  The FN was able to gain substantial support in legislative elections, 
not to mention the high levels of support Le Pen had in running for president.  In 2002, he 
received over 16% of the vote.  However, though many saw immigration as an important 
issue, quite a few of these voters felt that the FN was too radical for a democratic society.  
The moderate right, however, capitalized on this.  They co-opted the message of the FN, 
and then proceeded to demonize FN as too vulgar for such an enlightened society.  
Consequently, they gained support by addressing the issue in a way similar to that of the 
FN, thus offering an alternative to the FN to deal with the immigration issue, but only 
after the FN brought the issue to the forefront.    
It should be noted that France tends to form blocks during elections, which makes 
it more like Italy than is recognized in this study.   It may have been more realistic to try 
to explain that France has a “half” for blocks, making it similar to Italy, but the difference 
is that Italy fully operating in blocks makes it more complex.  However, this would have 
taken this Boolean analysis into the realm of fuzzy set logic, which, in all likelihood, 
would have changed more variables than just this one.   
The Analysis of Countries not having a Flank or Shift Effect       
 The negative cases do not match up perfectly with the positive cases, but they do 
so individually by countries and in various blocks of variables.  First, the first three 
political variables of CL, BLK and EMF are all zeros for all of the negative cases while 
three of the four positive cases display one positive factor.  And although they are 
positive on different variables, they are never positive for the negative cases.  A similar 
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pattern exists for the history of fascism or HF variable as two positive cases score a one 
on this while none of the negative cases display this pattern.  Thus, the diverse patterns of 
explanatory variables match the diverse patterns on the dependent variable in each 
country.  
 However, there is one exception to these general patterns.  France, which is a 
complex case with two outcomes, is exactly similar to Belgium, which does not have an 
effect.  To explain this pattern, I added the “ethnically divided country in state and 
society” variable.  This is scored zero for all countries except Belgium because this 
country has two languages, and in effect, two states.  On this score, we might engaged in 
two counterfactual scenarios:  (1) if Belgium was all French (i.e., Wallonia was the whole 
country), then Belgium would exhibit the French combination of a positive radical flank 
and moderate shift effects, but (2) if Belgium was all Dutch (i.e., Flanders was the whole 
country), then Belgium would be a negative case and would probably exhibit some of  the 
characteristics of Austria and possibly the Netherlands.  While these counterfactuals are 
hard to imagine, especially for Belgians, they do point to the impact of very different 
anti-immigrant in Wallonia (National Front) and Flanders (Vlaams Blok).  This division 
mitigates developments being the same in Belgium as in France with a single National 
Front.  A full study of divided anti-immigrant parties protecting ‘pure cultures’ from 
opposite cultural directions is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it clearly makes 
Belgium very different from France.  One could argue that it might lead to an 
ethnopluralist master frame, but the divisions between the Flemish and the Walloons 
largely mitigate against such a unified perspective.  So, at a late date in the analysis, this 
variable (EDSS) was added to help explain why Belgium is different from France.  
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Chapter 7:  Conclusion 
Since it has been introduced, radical flank effect theory has not been explored 
very thoroughly.  It has been explored in limited application, and has not been used 
outside of social movement theory.  In this inquiry, I have explored the expansion of its 
utility in other forms of organizational phenomenon.  By using a comparative historical 
methodology I imbue my work with specific knowledge, while finding evidence that 
facilitates the addition of generalizable knowledge to the field of social movements and 
political sociology.  This required an expansion of the radical flank effect to two other 
areas – the radical shift effect and the moderate shift effect.  Additionally, I hope that the 
development of radical shift effect as a concept, and its exploration will be a useful 
contribution to the study of social movements, and political sociology. 
Ragin states, “[s]ocial scientists have a love-hate relationship with the fact that 
naturally occurring social phenomena display limited diversity…limited diversity places 
severe constraints on possibilities for testing causal arguments” (1984:104).  This rings 
true with this study as well.  Because of the limited sample of western European 
democracies with anti-immigration parties active in the legislative elections, there is a 
case of limited diversity in this study.  However, because so little theory exists on radical 
flank effect, and no theory exists—until now—on moderate and radical shift effects, this 
is still a degree of progress.   
In Denmark, several circumstances came together to create a situation conducive 
to the success of the DFp.  In turn, it received significant support.  As evidenced by this 
amount of support, the DFp had found a gap in the political landscape.  The DFp 
provided voters with a far-right option, without invoking the stigma of racism.  As stated 
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above, the DFp was considered to be further right than its predecessor, the FrP, yet much 
less controversial.  The DFp showed that there was a demand for a party to take a more 
restrictive stance on immigration, and did it at a time of stability and confidence.  This 
resulted in a strong show of support in legislative elections in 1998, but even more so in 
2001 and 2005, enough support to put the DFp in a position to support the right wing 
coalition government.  In turn, the two moderate conservative parties—the KF and the 
V—began to co-opt the message of the DFp.  A radical shift effect occurs when the 
emergence of a successful anti-immigration party leads to the radicalization of the 
position of conventional conservatives.  In Denmark, this happened because the far-right 
party fulfilled a demand of the electorate that was not being addressed by the moderate 
right-wing political parties.  In an effort to regain some of the support lost the DFp, both 
moderate conservative parties began to adopt the anti-immigration issue—among other 
issues—from the DFp. 
In Austria, numerous conditions came together to generate a setting favorable to 
the success of the FPÖ.  In response, the FPÖ began to moderate its image to maintain its 
position in the realm of legitimate politics.  First, a high unemployment rate combined 
with high immigration and asylum rates created a climate conducive to support for the 
anti-immigration message of the FPÖ.  At the same time, it created a climate not 
conducive to novel political arrangements.  Thus, the FPÖ attempted to moderate its 
image, in an attempt to placate concerned Austrians as well as other nations reticent to 
work with the ÖVP- FPÖ coalition.  The presence of a charismatic leader also propelled 
the FPÖ out of obscurity, and simultaneously appealed to those with radical right 
leanings as well as those who felt Austria needed to be sheltered from the consequences 
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of immigration by non-European immigrants, whether economic or cultural 
consequences.  Finally, Haider was able to appeal to all aspects of Austrian identity: the 
identity of “victim” held by many after the annexation of Austria by Germany in the 
1930s, the identity of “unfairly accused” held by many in reaction to the accusations of 
Nazi collaboration by Austrians, or by those who actually were Nazi sympathizers. A 
moderate shift effect occurs when the marginal success of an anti-immigration party leads 
to its inclusion in the ruling coalition, which, in turn, compels the radical party to 
moderate its positions to further become part of the mainstream political apparatus.  In 
this case, the FPÖ did just this, which, paradoxically—among other issues, such as 
internal strife—led to its demise. 
The conditions in Italy that led to the +RFE are highly interrelated.  The fascist 
history in Italy simultaneously undermined any possibility of a far-right party like the LN 
from gaining significant support, though it also created a small minority of people 
nostalgic for fascism.  The block coalition formed by the moderate right and far right 
parties concurrently empowered the far-right parties by allowing them into the 
government, while also disabling them as negligible players in a large and powerful 
coalition.  Berlusconi managed to use Bossi as a tool to call attention to issues, while at 
the same time subtly discounting the LN’s position as too extreme. A positive radical 
flank effect occurs when the presence of a radical anti-immigration political party leads 
to gains for moderate conservatives.  This happens because the radical anti-immigrant 
party brings the issue into the political dialogue while the moderate conservative political 
party represents an acceptable and legitimate way to address the issues.  In this case, the 
  116
CDL not only represents an acceptable way to address the issue, they also can act as 
chaperone to the radical LN. 
 Though the FN did achieve some success, it never became a part of the 
government.  This investigation suggests that it was not the political position of the FN 
that alienated voters.  If it were, the moderate right parties would not have found success 
with that same position.  I argue that it was the invocation of racist rhetoric—along with 
anti-Semitic, heterosexist, and other hateful language—that kept the FN at the margins of 
French politics.  This is supported by evidence that suggests many French voters found 
validity in the platform of the FN, but could not bring themselves to support a party that 
embraces views so antithetical to the egalitarianism inherent in democracy.  Thus, the 
moderate right assumed a more radical position, similar to that of the FN, while it 
simultaneously gained electoral support as a more sensible choice than the FN.   A 
positive radical flank effect occurs when the presence of an anti-immigration political 
party leads to gains for moderate conservatives.  This happened in France because the FN 
brought the anti-immigration issue into the political dialogue, but the moderate 
conservative political parties represented what was perceived as a more legitimate 
political option to address the issues.  A radical shift effect occurs when the presence of 
an anti-immigration parties leads to the radicalization of the position of moderates, or 
causes the moderate parties to take a less conventional stance.  This happened in France 
because FN represented an unfilled need of the electorate that was not being addressed by 
the conventional political parties. 
This Boolean analysis has found four different explanations for four different 
flank or shift outcomes in four different countries.  At the same time it has differentiated 
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four additional countries without flank or shift outcomes from these positive outcomes 
based on the same consistent variables.  The results show that:  (1) only an ethnopluralist 
master frame could work in Denmark to produce a radical shift effect given the nature of 
a social democratic heritage, (2) that a charismatic leader in a country with a fascist past 
and with high unemployment produces a moderate shift effect (and not a radical flank 
effect), (3) that racist rhetoric with a history of fascism and inclusion in large block 
parties produces a positive radical flank effect, and (4) racist rhetoric without particularly 
threatening unemployment and without a ethnically divided society produces the most 
complex result, which is a positive radical flank and a moderate shift effect.  At the same 
time, none of the other four countries with negative outcomes exhibits any of these 
patterns – none have charismatic leaders, block parties, ethnopluralist master frames or a 
history of fascism.  On the three negative cases from the Nordic countries, the example of 
Denmark with an ethnopluralist master frame would probably be the only factor that 
could convert those countries toward more divisive ethnic politics.  And on the negative 
case of Belgium, only a unified national drift toward a racist rhetoric could work to 
produce flank or shift effects.  However, such unity is not at all likely. 
When discussing each country, and the political outcomes that have occurred as a 
result of the radical and moderate shifts observed in this study, it is difficult to ignore 
that, in each case, there are larger implications of each political outcome.  For instance, in 
Denmark and Austria these radical parties gained a lot of power.  In Denmark, the 
government policies changed significantly.  However, in Austria, government policy 
changed only slightly.   In France, where the FN was not able to gain significant support,  
things went pretty far but they were able to reel it in to a degree, and there was a 
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backlash.  Though it is beyond the scope of this study, there are still unknowns regarding 
the factors that influence to what degree a party is able to influence legislation, whether 
in the government or not.   
While one might want a perfect correspondence between the number of positive 
cases, this study has tried to stay true to the unique paths of each country with flank or 
shift effects.  As a result, this Boolean analysis takes full advantage of Charles Ragin’s 
concept of multiple conjunctural causation to show how differing patterns of common 
variables can largely produce the different results shown in this thesis.  Some may say 
that the same story could have been told with simple narratives about each country.  But 
this Boolean approach has two advantages over that method:  (1) narratives often employ 
a non-systematic approach that avoids the use of variables and that bathes the countries 
involved in total particularity, and/or (2) the Boolean method makes agreement, and more 
to the point, contradictions painfully obvious and necessary to deal with.  On this last 
point, narratives allow analysts to massage different explanations to such a point that 
contradictions can often be hidden or rationalized.  The Boolean method presents the data 
in such a form that such rationalization and ad hoc reasoning are largely avoided.    
At this juncture in my study, I am switching gears to address a void in the 
literature regarding radical anti-immigrant parties.  While there are a plethora of studies 
that test an abundance of theories regarding the success of particular radical anti-
immigration political parties, there is a severe shortage of information available that 
addresses why particular radical anti-immigration parties fail.  It is almost as if this empty 
space implies that the answer to the question, “Why don’t some radical anti-immigration 
parties succeed?” is supposed to be innately understood by those who study anti-
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immigration parties.  It is my sense that this innate understanding is based on the 
assumption that democracy cannot be conducive to exclusion, thus those anti-
immigration parties that succeed are the fluke—thus, the ones that need an explanation—
not those that do not succeed.  While it is not my intent to address this void in this work, 
it is surely worth noting that the void exists.   
Additionally, I wish to call attention to the usefulness this set of mechanisms 
could have when looking not only at the right, but also at the left.  In fact, an ideal study 
would take into account not just the right, nor just the left, but both at the same time, 
accounting for flank and shift effects that could occur across the partisan divide, creating 
a unified theory of political parties.  Additionally, the shift and flank effects are not 
limited to their usefulness to politics.  As mentioned at the beginning of this study, this 
theory was born from social movement literature.  However, it has not been applied very 
widely.  It could be applied in those cases not applicable to this study.  Although not why 
it was excluded from this study, the United States would not have been a good case 
because of the limited number of parties.  However, the flank and shift effects could be 
studied as applied to sects within a party.  In fact, it could be very useful to study the 
radical Tea Party Movement and its effect on the moderate sect of the Republican Party 
in the Untied States.  The radical flank and shift effects are not only useful for social 
movements and political parties, they could be useful anywhere there are sects within a 
movement or party. 
In this analysis, I explored the positive and negative radical flank effects, radical 
shift effect and the moderate shift effect, and the impact of these mechanisms on anti-
immigration parties in Western Europe.  The primary lesson to be learned from this study 
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is political parties do not exist in a vacuum.  While it is essential to explore how the 
organization and its platform influence the success of the party, it is also fundamental to 
be aware of the interactions between political parties.  While politics is not a zero-sum 
game, the actions of one party in the political system inevitably affect the other players in 
that system.  
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Appendix A: 
Political Representation, Unemployment Rates, Immigration Rates, and Asylum 
Rates 
 
Table A.1:  Danish Radical Anti-Immigrant and Conservative Political 
Representation at the National Level 
People’s Assembly 
 FrP DFp KF V 
1980 20 -- 22 22 
1981 20 -- 22 22 
1982 16 -- 26 21 
1983 16 -- 26 21 
1984 6 -- 42 22 
1985 6 -- 42 22 
1986 6 -- 42 22 
1987 6 -- 42 22 
1988 12 -- 38 22 
1989 16 -- 35 22 
1990 16 -- 35 22 
1991 12 -- 30 29 
1992 12 -- 30 29 
1993 12 -- 30 29 
1994 12 -- 29 32 
1995 11 -- 27 42 
1996 11 -- 27 42 
1997 11 -- 27 42 
1998 5 11 18 42 
1999 4 13 16 42 
2000 4 13 16 42 
2001 4 14 16 44 
2002 0 22 16 56 
2003 0 22 16 56 
2004 0 22 16 56 
2005 0 24 18 52 
Notes: Election year seats determined by proportional calculation.   
Source: Political Handbook of the World 
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Table A.2:  Unemployment and Migration Rates in Denmark, 1980 to 2001 
 
          Unemployment  Immigration    Asylum                   Unemployment  Immigration  Asylum 
          Rates                   Rates                Rates                       Rates                  Rates               Rates 
1980   5.5%                     -                       0.004% 1993   9.5                        0.30                0.276 
1981   7.3                        -                       0.006 1994   7.7                        0.30                0.129 
1982   8.4                        -                       0.006    1995   6.8                        0.63                0.097 
1983   9.0                        -                       0.006 1996   6.3                        0.47                0.112 
1984   8.5                        -                       0.084 1997   5.2                        0.39                0.097 
1985   7.1                      0.34                   0.170 1998   4.9                        0.40                0.177 
1986   5.4                      0.30                   0.182 1999   5.1                        0.38                0.232 
1987   5.4                      0.30                   0.053 2000   4.4                        0.43                0.229 
1988   5.7                      0.27                   0.092 2001   4.5                        0.47                0.234 
1989   6.8                      0.29                   0.090 2002   4.6                        0.41                0.113 
1990   7.2                      0.29                   0.103 2003   5.4                        0.35                0.085       
1991   7.9                      0.34                   0.089 2004   5.5                        0.35                0.060   
1992   8.6                      0.33                   0.269 2005   4.8                        0.37                0.042  
Notes: Unemployment numbers for 1980-1981 were estimated from unstandardized unemployment rates by calculating a margin of 
difference for several years for which both unstandardized and standardized rates were available, and retroactively applying it to the 
unstandardized rates available. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 2007, 2000, and 1984; OECD SOPEMI International Migration Outlook 2008; Trends in 
International Migration 2005, 2002, 2001, 1998, and 1992. 
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Table A.3: Austrian Radical Anti-Immigrant and Conservative Political 
Representation at the National Level  
National Council 
 FPÖ  ÖVP 
1980 11 77 
1981 11 77 
1982 11 77 
1983 12 80 
1984 12 81 
1985 12 81 
1986 13 81 
1987 18 77 
1988 18 77 
1989 18 77 
1990 21 73 
1991 33 60 
1992 33 60 
1993 33 60 
1994 35 58 
1995 42 52 
1996 40 53 
1997 40 53 
1998 40 53 
1999 43 53 
2000 52 52 
2001 52 52 
2002 48 55 
2003 19 79 
2004 19 79 
2005 19 79 
Notes: Election year seats determined by proportional calculation.   
Source: Political Handbook of the World 
  124
 
Table A.4:  Unemployment and Migration Rates in Austria, 1980 to 2005 
 
          Unemployment  Immigration    Asylum                   Unemployment  Immigration  Asylum 
          Rates                   Rates                Rates                       Rates                  Rates               Rates 
1980   1.2%                       -                     0.123% 1993    3.9                         -                  0.061 
1981   1.7                          -                     0.457  1994    3.8                         -                  0.064 
1982   2.4                          -                     0.083      1995    3.9                         -                  0.073 
1983   2.8                          -                     0.078   1996    4.4                         -                  0.087 
1984   2.9                          -                     0.095   1997    4.5                         -                  0.083 
1985   2.7                          -                     0.089 1998    4.5                       0.73              0.171 
1986   2.4                          -                     0.113 1999    3.9                       0.89              0.248 
1987   2.9                          -                     0.150 2000    3.7                       0.81              0.225 
1988   2.9                          -                     0.208  2001    3.6                       0.92              0.371 
1989   2.4                          -                     0.287 2002    4.2                       1.14              0.483 
1990   2.4                          -                     0.295    2003    4.3                       1.19              0.396 
1991    2.7                         -                     0.349 2004    4.8                       1.33              0.275     
1992    2.7                         -                     0.205 2005    5.2                       1.24              0.274  
Notes: Unemployment numbers for 1980-1992 were estimated from unstandardized unemployment rates by calculating a margin of 
difference for several years for which both unstandardized and standardized rates were available, and retroactively applying it to the 
unstandardized rates available. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 2007, 2000, and 1984; OECD SOPEMI International Migration Outlook 2008; Trends in 
International Migration 2005, 2002, 2001, 1998, and 1992. 
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Table A.5: Italian Radical Anti-Immigrant and Conservative Political 
Representation at the National Level 
A.  Chamber of Deputies 
 DC MSI LN PL/ PBG 
1980 262 30 -- -- 
1981 262 30 -- -- 
1982 262 30 -- -- 
1983 243 36 -- -- 
1984 225 42 -- -- 
1985 225 42 -- -- 
1986 225 42 -- -- 
1987 230 38 -- -- 
1988 234 35 -- -- 
1989 234 35 -- -- 
1990 234 35 -- -- 
1991 234 35 -- -- 
1992 213 34 40 -- 
1993 206 34 55 -- 
1994 83 8 13 280 
1995 46 (PL/PBG) (PL/PBG) 366 
1996 -- (PL/PBG) 50 283 
1997 -- (PL/PBG) 59 246 
1998 -- (PL/PBG) 59 246 
1999 -- (PL/PBG) 59 246 
2000 -- (House of 
Freedoms) 
59 246 
2001 -- (House of 
Freedoms) 
21 324 
2002 -- (House of 
Freedoms) 
(House of 
Freedoms) 
368 
2003 -- (House of 
Freedoms) 
(House of 
Freedoms) 
368 
2004 -- (House of 
Freedoms) 
(House of 
Freedoms) 
368 
2005 -- (House of 
Freedoms) 
(House of 
Freedoms) 
368 
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Table A.5: Italian Radical Anti-Immigrant and Conservative Political 
Representation at the National Level (continued)  
B.  Senate 
 DC MSI LN PL/ PBG MS-FT 
1980 138 13 -- -- -- 
1981 138 13 -- -- -- 
1982 138 13 -- -- -- 
1983 129 16 -- -- -- 
1984 120 18 -- -- -- 
1985 120 18 -- -- -- 
1986 120 18 -- -- -- 
1987 122 17 -- -- -- 
1988 124 16 -- -- -- 
1989 124 16 -- -- -- 
1990 124 16 -- -- -- 
1991 124 16 -- -- -- 
1992 112 16 18 119 -- 
1993 107 16 25 156 -- 
1994 50 4 6 128 -- 
1995 31 (PL/PBG) (PL/PBG) 116 1 
1996 10 (PL/PBG) 19 116 1 
1997 -- (PLPBG) 27 116 1 
1998 -- (PL/PBG) 27 116 1 
1999 -- (PL/PBG) 27 116 1 
2000 -- (House of 
Freedoms) 
27 116 1 
2001 -- (House of 
Freedoms) 
10 155 0 
2002 -- (House of 
Freedoms) 
(House of 
Freedoms) 
177 (House of 
Freedoms) 
2003 -- (House of 
Freedoms) 
(House of 
Freedoms) 
177 (House of 
Freedoms) 
2004 -- (House of 
Freedoms) 
(House of 
Freedoms) 
177 (House of 
Freedoms) 
2005 -- (House of 
Freedoms) 
(House of 
Freedoms) 
177 (House of 
Freedoms) 
Notes: Election year seats determined by proportional calculation.   
Source: Political Handbook of the World. 
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Table A.6:  Unemployment and Migration Rates in Italy, 1980 to 2005  
 
            Unemployment Immigration  Asylum                   Unemployment  Immigration  Asylum 
            Rates                  Rates              Rates                       Rates                  Rates               Rates 
1980     7.5%                     -                      -  1993            9.8                    -                0.002 
1981     7.8                        -                      -  1994          10.6                    -                0.003 
1982     6.4                        -                      -  1995          11.2                    -                0.003 
1983     7.5                        -               0.005%  1996          11.2                    -                0.001 
1984     8.0                        -               0.008  1997          11.2                    -                0.003 
1985     8.3                        -               0.010   1998          11.4                   0.19           0.019 
1986     9.0                        -               0.015  1999          11.0                   0.47           0.058 
1987     9.7                        -               0.019  2000          10.1                   0.47           0.027 
1988     9.7                        -               0.002   2001            9.1                   0.40           0.017 
1989     9.7                        -               0.004  2002            8.6                   0.67           0.028             
1990     8.9                        -               0.008  2003            8.4                    -                0.023            
1991     8.5                        -               0.056  2004            8.0                   0.55           0.017            
1992     8.8                        -               0.005  2005            7.7                   0.36           0.016            
Notes: Unemployment rates are standardized rates.  
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 2007, 2000, and 1984; OECD SOPEMI International Migration Outlook 2008; Trends in 
International Migration 2005, 2002, 2001, 1998, and 1992. 
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*In 1986 the number of seats in the Nation
Notes: Election year seats determined by pro
al Assembly increased from 491 to 577. 
portional calculation. Source: Political Handbook of the World 
Table A.7: French Radical Anti-Immigrant and Conservative Political 
Representation at the National Level 
National Assembly 
 FN RPR UDF CNIP DL UDF/RPR 
1980 0 155 122 (UDF) -- -- 
1981 0 118 90 3 -- -- 
1982 0 85 62 5 -- -- 
1983 0 85 62 5 -- -- 
1984 0 85 62 5 -- -- 
1985 0 85 62 5 -- -- 
1986* 26 73 56 1 -- 110 
1987 35 77 53 0 -- 147 
1988 17 105 95 0 -- 67 
1989 1 129 130 0 -- -- 
1990 1 129 130 0 -- -- 
1991 1 129 130 0 -- -- 
1992 1 129 130 0 -- -- 
19938 0 219 193 0 -- -- 
1994 0 247 213 0 -- -- 
1995 0 247 213 0 -- -- 
1996 0 247 213 0 -- -- 
1997 1 181 152 0 -- -- 
1998 1 134 108 0 0 -- 
1999 1 134 108 0 0 -- 
2000 1 134 108 0 0 -- 
2001 1 134 108 0 0 -- 
2002 0 254 65 0 1 -- 
2003 0 333 29 0 2 -- 
2004 0 333 29 0 2 -- 
2005 0 333 29 0 2 -- 
                                                        
 In the 1993 French parliamentary elections the RPR and the UDF ran on joint lists in some districts 
nd separately in others. 
8
a
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Table A.8:  Unemployment and Migration Rates in France, 1980 to 2005  
 
            Unemployment  Immigration Asylum                   Unemployment  Immigration  Asylum 
            Rates                   Rates             Rates                       Rates                  Rates               Rates 
1980     6.2%                   0.11%          0.034%     1993           11.1                   0.17                0.047  
1981     7.4                      0.14             0.036 1994           11.7                   0.15                0.044  
1982     7.7                      0.26             0.040 1995           11.1                   0.13                0.034 
1983     8.1                      0.11             0.040  1996           11.6                   0.13                0.029  
1984     9.7                      0.09             0.038 1997           11.5                   0.12                0.036  
1985    10.2                     0.08             0.051 1998           11.1                   0.18                0.037 
1986    10.3                     0.07             0.046 1999           10.5                   0.14                0.051   
1987    10.4                     0.07             0.048 2000            9.1                    0.15                0.063 
1988      9.4                     0.08             0.060 2001            8.4                    0.17                0.088  
1989      8.9                     0.09             0.106 2002            8.6                    0.20                0.095 
1990      8.5                     0.18             0.094    2003            9.0                    0.22                0.096  
1991      9.0                     0.19             0.081 2004            9.3                    0.23                0.094   
1992      9.9                     0.20             0.049 2005            9.3                    0.22                0.079    
Notes: Unemployment rates are standardized rates. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 2007, 2000, and 1984; OECD SOPEMI International Migration Outlook 2008; Trends in 
International Migration 2005, 2002, 2001, 1998, and 1992. 
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Table A.9:  Belgian Radical Anti-Immigrant and Conservative Political 
Representation at the National Level  
People’s Assembly 
 VB VLD CD&V 
1980 1 22 57 
1981 1 23 55 
1982 1 28 43 
1983 1 28 43 
1984 1 28 43 
1985 1 27 44 
1986 1 22 49 
1987 1 22 49 
1988 2 25 43 
1989 2 25 43 
1990 2 25 43 
1991 3 25 43 
1992 12 26 39 
1993 12 26 39 
1994 12 26 39 
1995* 12 23 33 
1996 11 21 29 
1997 11 21 29 
1998 11 21 29 
1999 13 22 25 
2000 15 23 22 
2001 15 23 22 
2002 15 23 22 
2003 17 24 21 
2004 18 25 21 
2005 18 25 21 
*In 1995 the number of seats in the Chamber of Representatives decreased from 212 to 150. 
Notes: Election year seats determined by roportional calculation.   p
Source: Political Handbook of the World 
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Table A.10: Unemployment and Migration Rates in Belgium, 1980 to 2005 
 
           Unemployment   Immigration    Asylum                   Unemployment  Immigration  Asylum 
            Rates                   Rates                Rates                       Rates                  Rates               Rates 
1980      8.8%                    0.47%             0.027%  1993    8.6                     0.53                 0.262  
1981      9.5                       0.42                 0.024  1994    9.8                     0.55                 0.144 
1982     10.1                      0.37                 0.031   1995    9.7                     0.52                 0.114 
1983     11.0                      0.35                 0.029    1996    9.6                     0.51                 0.122 
1984     11.1                      0.38                 0.038  1997    9.2                     0.48                 0.116 
1985     10.4                      0.38                 0.054  1998    9.3                     0.50                 0.215 
1986     10.3                      0.40                 0.077  1999    8.5                     0.56                 0.350     
1987     10.0                      0.41                 0.061   2000    6.9                     0.56                 0.416     
1988       8.8                      0.39                 0.046   2001    6.6                     0.64                 0.239 
1989       7.4                      0.44                 0.083   2002    7.5                     0.68                 0.182 
1990       6.6                      0.51                 0.130   2003    8.2                     0.67                 0.164 
1991       6.4                      0.54                 0.154  2004    8.4                     0.70                 0.148 
1992       7.1                      0.55                 0.174             2005    8.5                     0.75                 0.154 
Notes: Unemployment rates are standardized rates. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 2007, 2000, and 1984; OECD SOPEMI International Migration Outlook 2008; Trends in 
International Migration 2005, 2002, 2001, 1998, and 1992. 
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Table A.11: Norwegian Radical Anti-Immigrant and Conservative Political 
Representation at the National Level 
People’s Assembly 
 FRP KrF H 
1980 0 22 41 
1981 1 20 45 
1982 4 16 53 
1983 4 16 53 
1984 4 16 53 
1985 3 16 52 
1986 2 16 50 
1987 2 16 50 
1988 2 16 50 
1989 8 15 46 
1990 22 14 37 
1991 22 14 37 
1992 22 14 37 
1993 18 14 34 
1994 10 13 28 
1995 10 13 28 
1996 10 13 28 
1997 14 16 27 
1998 25 25 23 
1999 25 25 23 
2000 25 25 23 
2001 25 24 28 
2002 26 22 38 
2003 26 22 38 
2004 26 22 38 
2005 30 19 33 
Notes: Election year seats determined by roportional calculation.   p
Source: Political Handbook of the World 
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Table A.12: Unemployment and Migration Rates in Norway, 1980 to 2005 
 
            Unemployment Immigration Asylum          Unemployment  Immigration  Asylum 
            Rates                  Rates             Rates              Rates                  Rates               Rates 
1980      1.6%                0.29%         0.002%      1993   6.6                       0.52            0.299 
1981      2.1                   0.32             0.002 1994   6.0                       0.41            0.078 
1982      2.6                   0.34             0.002   1995   5.5                       0.38            0.034 
1983      3.5                   0.32             0.005 1996   4.8                       0.39            0.041 
1984      3.2                   0.31             0.007 1997   4.0                       0.50            0.052 
1985      2.7                   0.36             0.020  1998   3.2                       0.60            0.189 
1986      2.0                   0.40             0.065 1999   3.2                       0.72            0.228 
1987      2.1                   0.57             0.205  2000   3.4                       0.62            0.241 
1988      3.3                   0.55             0.157 2001   3.6                       0.54            0.327 
1989      5.4                   0.44             0.104  2002   3.9                       0.68            0.385                     
1990      5.8                   0.37             0.094 2003   4.5                       0.59            0.350                     
1991      6.0                   0.38             0.108 2004   4.4                       0.61            0.174                     
1992      6.5                   0.40            0.121 2005   4.6                       0.68            0.118                   
Notes: Unemployment rates are standardized rates. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 2007, 2000, and 1984; OECD SOPEMI International Migration Outlook 2008; Trends in 
International Migration 2005, 2002, 2001, 1998, and 1992. 
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Table A.13: Finnish Radical Anti-Immigrant and Conservative Political 
Representation at the National Level 
People’s Assembly 
 PS KD KOK 
1980 7 9 47 
1981 7 9 47 
1982 7 9 47 
1983 15 4 45 
1984 17 3 44 
1985 17 3 44 
1986 17 3 44 
1987 11 5 51 
1988 9 5 53 
1989 9 5 53 
1990 9 5 53 
1991 7 7 43 
1992 7 8 40 
1993 7 8 40 
1994 7 8 40 
1995 2 7 39 
1996 1 7 39 
1997 1 7 39 
1998 1 7 39 
1999 1 9 44 
2000 1 10 46 
2001 1 10 46 
2002 1 10 46 
2003 3 8 41 
2004 3 7 40 
2005 3 7 40 
Notes: Election year seats determined by roportional calculation.   p
Source: Political Handbook of the World 
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Table A.14: Unemployment and Migration Rates in Finland, 1980 to 2005 
 
            Unemployment Immigration    Asylum                   Unemployment  Immigration  Asylum 
            Rates                  Rates                Rates                       Rates                  Rates               Rates 
1980     4.6%                      -                       -  1993    16.4                      0.22                  0.039 
1981     5.7                         -                       -  1994    16.8                      0.15                  0.016 
1982     6.1                         -                       -  1995    15.4                      0.14                  0.016 
1983     6.1                         -                       -  1996    14.7                      0.15                  0.014 
1984     5.9                         -                       -  1997    12.6                      0.16                  0.019 
1985     6.0                         -                       -  1998    11.3                      0.16                  0.025 
1986     6.7                         -                       -  1999    10.2                      0.15                  0.060 
1987     4.9                         -                       -  2000     9.7                       0.18                  0.061 
1988     4.1                         -                   0.002%  2001     9.1                       0.21                  0.032 
1989     3.1                       0.09%            0.004    2002     9.1                       0.19                  0.066          
1990     3.2                       0.13               0.054   2003     9.1                       0.18                  0.062          
1991     6.7                       0.25               0.042  2004     8.8                       0.22                  0.074          
1992    11.7                      0.21               0.071  2005     8.3                       0.24                  0.069          
Notes: Unemployment rates are standardized rates. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 2007, 2000, and 1984; OECD SOPEMI International Migration Outlook 2008; Trends in 
International Migration 2005, 2002, 2001, 1998, and 1992. 
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Table A.15: Swedish Radical Anti-Immigrant and Conservative Political 
Representation at the National Level 
People’s Assembly 
 NyD MSP CP FPL Kd 
1980 -- 73 64 38 0 
1981 -- 73 64 38 0 
1982 -- 77 62 33 0 
1983 -- 86 56 21 0 
1984 -- 86 56 21 0 
1985 -- 83 52 30 0 
1986 -- 76 43 51 1 
1987 -- 76 43 51 1 
1988 -- 74 43 49 1 
1989 -- 66 42 44 0 
1990 -- 66 42 44 0 
1991 7 71 39 41 8 
1992 24 80 31 33 27 
1993 24 80 31 33 27 
1994 17 80 30 31 24 
1995 0 80 27 26 15 
1996 0 80 27 26 15 
1997 0 80 27 26 15 
1998 0 81 24 23 23 
1999 0 82 18 17 42 
2000 0 82 18 17 42 
2001 0 82 18 17 42 
2002 - 74 19 26 39 
2003 - 55 22 48 33 
2004 - 55 22 48 33 
2005 - 55 22 48 33 
Notes: Election year seats determined by proportional calculation.   
Source: Political Handbook of the World 
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Table A.16: Unemployment and Migration Rates in Sweden, 1980 to 2005  
 
            Unemployment  Immigration    Asylum                   Unemployment  Immigration  Asylum 
            Rates                   Rates                Rates                       Rates                  Rates               Rates 
1980     2.0%                       -                        -   1993    9.1                       0.62                  0.429          
1981     2.5                          -                        -  1994    9.4                       0.85                  0.211    
1982     3.3                          -                        -   1995    8.8                       0.41                  0.101 
1983     3.7                       0.22%              0.048%  1996    9.6                       0.33                  0.065 
1984     3.3                       0.17                 0.144  1997    9.9                       0.38                  0.108  
1985     2.9                       0.16                 0.174  1998    8.2                       0.40                  0.144 
1986     2.7                       0.41                 0.174  1999    6.7                       0.39                  0.126 
1987     2.2                       0.44                 0.215  2000    5.6                       0.48                  0.183 
1988     1.8                       0.53                 0.231  2001    4.9                       0.49                  0.263 
1989     1.6                       0.69                 0.352  2002    5.0                       0.53                  0.369          
1990     1.7                       0.62                 0.342  2003    5.6                       0.54                  0.349 
1991    3.1                        0.51                 0.316  2004    6.3                       0.53                  0.258          
1992    5.6                        0.45                 0.963  2005    7.3                       0.57                  0.195          
Notes: Unemployment rates are standardized rates. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 2007, 2000, and 1984; OECD SOPEMI International Migration Outlook 2008; Trends in 
International Migration 2005, 2002, 2001, 1998, and 1992. 
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Appendix B: 
Preliminary Boolean Tables  
 
  
Table B.1:  The Boolean Analysis of Radical Flank, Radical Shift and Moderate Shift 
Effects: 1980-84 
 Denmark Austria Italy France Belgium Norway Finland Sweden 
AIPP 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
UE 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
IMG - - - 0 0 0 - 0 
ASY 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 
AIPRC n/a n/a 0 0 0 0 n/a n/a 
RFE+ n/a n/a 0 0 0 0 n/a n/a 
RSHFT n/a n/a 0 0 0 0 n/a n/a 
RFE- n/a n/a 0 0 0 0 n/a n/a 
MSHIFT n/a n/a 0 0 0 0 n/a n/a 
 
Table B.2:  The Boolean Analysis of Radical Flank, Radical Shift and Moderate Shift 
Effects: 1985-89 
 Denmark Austria Italy France Belgium Norway Finland Sweden 
AIPP 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
UE 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
IMG 0 - - 0 0 0 0 0 
ASY 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
AIPRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a n/a 
RFE+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a n/a 
RSHIFT 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a n/a 
RFE- 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a n/a 
MSHIFT 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a n/a 
 
Table B.3:  The Boolean Analysis of Radical Flank, Radical Shift and Moderate Shift 
Effects: 1990-1994 
 Denmark Austria Italy France Belgium Norway Finland Sweden 
AIPP 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
UE 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 
IMG 0 - - 1 1 0 1 1 
ASY 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 
AIPRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 
RFE+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 
RSHIFT 0 0 0 1 0 0 n/a 0 
RFE- 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 
MSHIFT 0 0 0 1 0 0 n/a 0 
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Table B.4:  The Boolean Analysis of Radical Flank, Radical Shift and Moderate Shift 
Effects: 1995-1999 
 Denmark Austria Italy France Belgium Norway Finland Sweden 
AIPP 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
UE 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
IMG 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 
ASY 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 
AIPRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 
RFE+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 
RSHIFT 0 0 0 1 0 0 n/a 0 
RFE- 0 0 0 1 0 0 n/a 0 
MSHIFT 0 0 0 1 0 0 n/a 0 
FOR BOTH: n/a: not anti-immigration yet, -: does not exist yet 
 
Variables: 
AIPP 1 for anti-immigration party parliamentary presence, and 0 for absence.  
UE 1 for an unemployment rate over cutting point established for country, 0 for at or under.  
IMG 1 for an immigration rate over cutting point established for country, 0 for at or under. 
ASY 1 for inflow of asylum-seeker rate over cutting point established for country, 0 for at or under  
AIPRC 1 for anti-immigration party in ruling coalition/support to ruling coalition in any year during period 
RFE+ 1 for positive radical flank effect 0 for no positive radical flank effect at any time during period 
RSHIFT 1 for radical shift effect 0 for no radical shift effect at any time during period 
RFE- 1 for negative radical flank effect 0 for no negative radical flank effect at any time during period 
MSHIFT 1 for moderate shift effect 0 for no moderate shift effect at any time during period 
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Appendix C: 
Cutting Points for Boolean Table 
 
Table C.1: Cutting Points for Boolean Table 
 Unemployment Rate Immigration Rate Asylum-Seeker Inflow Rate 
Denmark 6.4% 0.37% 0.117% 
Austria 3.3% 1.03% 0.206% 
Italy 9.2% 0.44% 0.015% 
France 9.5% 0.15% 0.058% 
Belgium 8.8% 0.51% 0.137% 
Norway 4.0% 0.47% 0.131% 
Finland 8.7% 0.18% 0.040% 
Sweden 5.1% 0.47% 0.250% 
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